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Schroeder: Power Imbalances in College Athletics and an Exploited Standard:

POWER IMBALANCES IN COLLEGE
ATHLETICS AND AN EXPLOITED STANDARD:
IS TITLE IX DEAD?
Without a doubt, Title IX has opened the doors of opportunity for
generations of women and girls to compete, to achieve, and to pursue their
American Dreams.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1972, a long line of decisions by federal courts has watered
down Title IX so that it no longer serves the purpose for which it was
designed. The courts have failed to enforce Title IX in accordance with
its legislative goals, and the hierarchical power imbalances existing in
college athletics increase the danger of an exploited standard. These
problems hinder efforts aimed at preventing sexual harassment, and
merge to expose vulnerable athletes to a risk of harassment with no
feasible contacts to whom they can report such harassment. To illustrate,
consider the following:
A college junior secures her position again as the star pitcher on her
successful college softball team. Most likely, the majority of the coaches
and other personnel are male. After a tough loss for the star pitcher, the
head coach confronts her, explaining to her that in order to retain her
position, she needs to meet with him privately for personal pitching
lessons. The young woman agrees, sensing that if she refused she would
find herself at the end of the bench. During these lessons, the coach
makes suggestive comments, asks increasingly vulgar questions about
her sexual history, and begins to suggestively touch her. She tries to
make clear to her coach that she is there only for softball, but the coach
disregards her objections and continues his harassment.
The pitcher is worried about playing time, so she does not want to
report her coach to anyone. Even if she did want to report him, she is
not sure where she would go. The pitcher finally goes to the assistant
athletic director to report the inappropriate behavior. The assistant
athletic director listens to the pitcher and advises her to stop
encouraging the coach, who is one of the best coaches in the country.
U.S. Secretary of Education Rod Paige, June 2002 “Open to all”: Title IX at Thirty, The
Secretary of Education’s Commission on Opportunity in Athletics, U.S. Department of
Education, Washington D.C. (Feb. 23, 2003), http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/
athletics/title9report.doc (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) (emphasis in original). See also David S.
Cohen, Limiting Gebser: Institutional Liability for Non-Harassment Sex Discrimination Under
Title IX, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 311, 312 (2004). The Secretary of Education’s report was
reflective of the general public’s view that Title IX is synonymous with sports because
President Bush limited the Commission’s focus to athletics equity. Id.
1

1483

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 12

1484 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

The athletic director relays these comments to the coach in the form of an
informal verbal warning.
At the end of the season, the star pitcher is emotionally distraught
and decides against playing summer ball for the coach, in effect ending
her dream of playing professionally. She brings a Title IX claim for
sexual harassment against the school. The trial court grants summary
judgment for the school district because the assistant athletic director
was not the proper person to receive notice, and because the warning
issued showed that the school was not indifferent. The very legislation
that was enacted to foster equality in athletics and education has been
watered down, consequently allowing the harassment of this young
pitcher because she is at the bottom of a dangerous power hierarchy.
Because of the distorted way in which the Court has interpreted Title
IX and the power imbalances inherent in the college athletic world,
schools are able to dodge legal liability by promulgating reactive
regulations that meet minimal national requirements. According to the
Supreme Court, Title IX can give rise to a private right of action for
monetary damages against a recipient of federal funds.2 However, the
Court has held that damages are only recoverable if the victim can
establish the school had actual notice of, and was deliberately indifferent
to, harassment that is so pervasive, severe, and objectively offensive that
it deprives the student or athlete of her educational benefits or activities.3
In addition, college athletic teams are marked by power imbalances, with
players at the bottom of the power structure.4 As a result, Title IX does
not prevent sexual harassment in the hierarchical college athletic world.
This power structure makes the athletic team an environment ripe
for sexually harassing behavior that goes unreported. This weakened
standard under Title IX and the power imbalance inherent in college
athletics allow many schools to avoid liability in the face of clear sexual
harassment, especially in the close-knit world of college athletics.5
Schools are allowed to adopt purely reactive measures; consequently,
not enough attention is given to the development of proactive policies to

See infra Parts II.A–B (articulating the legal test for federal funds recipient liability).
See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (setting forth the
actual notice and deliberate indifference standard); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (explaining the severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive
requirement).
4
See infra Part III.B (exploring the depth of the power imbalance between a coach and
player, as well as other members of the athletic staff and the athlete).
5
See infra Part III.C (discussing the interplay between a weak legal standard and the
power imbalances in college athletics that lead to legal loopholes schools may use to
circumvent liability for sexual harassment).
2
3
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prevent this harassment from ever occurring.6 The purpose of this Note
is to show that the judicially created standard for determining school
liability for sexual harassment under Title IX distorts the congressional
intent behind the statute and should be modified to accurately reflect the
true intent underlying Title IX. In addition, school policies must be
changed in order to reflect the obstacles presented by the inherent power
structure of college athletics.
Part II of this Note explores the complicated legislative and judicial
history of Title IX, with special emphasis on its use in the world of
college athletics.7 Part III analyzes the inherent power imbalances in
college athletics and the easily twisted standard for school liability,
which encourages the formulation of merely reactive institutional
procedural safeguards.8 Part IV presents several proposed changes to
the standard and suggests additions to the existing regulations
implementing and enforcing Title IX that will create a strong set of
community standards and help prevent sexual harassment in college
athletics.9
II. BACKGROUND OF TITLE IX
In order to understand the importance of Title IX, one must first
understand its complicated history. Part II.A of this Note provides
background information regarding the birth of the bill and general
legislative history behind its passage.10 Part II.B analyzes the pertinent
Supreme Court cases that have established a private cause of action with
the right to damages within Title IX.11 Part II.C explains the specific test

See 34 C.F.R. § 106.9 (2003) (explaining regulatory requirements promulgated by the
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights); § 106.31(b) (2003) (discussing the
corrective measure a school is to take upon receiving notice that sexual harassment has
occurred).
7
See infra Part II (discussing the history of Title IX, from Senator Bayh’s original idea to
the most recent cases interpreting liability of a school under Title IX).
8
See infra Part III (explaining that the existence of power imbalances on a college
athletic team, in conjunction with the exploited Gebser standard, effectively eliminates the
prevention and reporting of sexual harassment in college athletics).
9
See infra Part IV (proposing several changes to the standard and several additional
regulations the Department of Education should promulgate to encourage creating an
institution that values preventing sexual harassment on its athletic teams).
10
See infra Part II.A (examining the origins of Title IX and the administrative regulations
that followed, and demonstrating the intent of Title IX and the widening class of persons
and harms covered by Title IX).
11
See infra Part II.B (tracking the interpretation of Title IX through several Supreme
Court cases).
6

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 12

1486 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

that has evolved for use in sexual harassment cases and examines
specific examples of when this standard has been applied.12
A. The Legislative Promise of Title IX
In 1971, Senator Birch Bayh introduced the first version of the bill
that would become Title IX.13 Senator Bayh, in his efforts to get the bill
passed, denounced the prevalence of sex discrimination in education:
“[O]ne of the great failings of the American educational system is the
continuation of corrosive and unjustified discrimination against
women.”14 On June 23, 1972, Congress enacted a law that would forever
change the face of public education.15 Prior to the enactment of Title IX,
many educational institutions were free to discriminate against women
and girls.16 Title IX was enacted as part of the 1972 Education
Amendments, and provides the following protection:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any

See infra Part II.C (discussing the standard put forward in Gebser, and clarified in
Franklin, that has diverged from Congress’s intent behind the language of Title IX).
13
117 Cong. Rec. 30,399 (1971) (noting that the original amendment to the Education Act
focused on increased access to higher and graduate education).
14
118 Cong. Rec. 5802-03 (1972). Senator Bayh continued, “It is clear to me that sex
discrimination reached into all facets of education—admissions, scholarship programs,
faculty hiring and promotion, professional staffing, and pay scales.” Id. Available statistics
supplement Senator Bayh’s statement: in 1972, fewer than 32,000 women competed in
intercollegiate athletics.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Policy
Interpretation, 45 C.F.R. pt. 86 (1979); see also Eldon E. Snyder & Elmer Spreitzer,
Participation in Sport as Related to Educational Expectations among High School Girls, 50
BOWLING GREEN ST. UNIV. SOCIOLOGY OF EDUC. 47, (1977). Even as early as 1968,
researchers established that athletic participation is positively related to academic
achievement and to educational expectations. Id. According to the National Collegiate
Athletic Association, Title IX has had a positive impact on the number of college women
participating in competitive athletics; it is now nearly five times the pre-Title IX rate.
NATION COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION (NCAA), 1981-82–2005-06 NCAA SPORTS
SPONSORSHIP AND PARTICIPATION RATES REPORT 76 (May 2007), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/ PariticipationRates20084232c5b7-6441412c-80f1-7d85f3536a51.pdf.In 2005-06, a record number of 170,526 women competed,
representing 42% of college athletes nationwide. Id.
15
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). Title IX was enacted as part
of the Education Amendments of 1972, that, as a whole, dealt with rising educational costs,
increased student enrollment, and the changing work world. Id. § 1681.
16
“Open to All”, supra note 1. This report attributes the remarkable increase in female
participation since Title IX to both the legislation and changing ideas about women’s
“proper” role in society. Id.
12
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Sexual harassment was not itself mentioned in the congressional
debates or text of Title IX because Title IX was originally intended only
to combat sexual discrimination.18 However, since the passage of Title
IX, administrative regulations promulgated by the Department of
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) have further defined sexual
discrimination, clarified exactly which classes of individuals are
protected, and indicated that the scope of behavior Title IX was intended
to remedy includes sexual harassment.19 In order to continue receiving
federal funds, a school must comply with Title IX and the Department of
17
20 U.S.C. § 1681. This statute continues to describe groups and settings where
discrimination is allowed, for example, religious organizations with contrary religious
tenets, military training schools, public schools with continuing traditions of only
admitting one sex, social fraternities or sororities, voluntary youth organizations, Boy or
Girl conferences, mother-daughter or father-son activities, beauty pageants, or situations
involving statistical evidence of imbalance. Id. § 1681(a)(2)-(9). See 118 Cong. Rec. at 5803.
The sponsor of the bill, Senator Bayh, described the bill, stating that “[Title IX] is
broad . . . [T]he heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination in
educational programs receiving Federal funds. The amendment would cover such crucial
aspects as admissions procedures, scholarships, and faculty employment, with limited
exceptions.” Id. See also Recognizing the Contributions of Patsy Takemoto Mink, Pub. L.
No. 107-255, 116 Stat. 1734 (2002) (indicating that Title IX may be called the Patsy
Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act).
18
Cohen, supra note 1, at 314. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.40 (2003). Instead, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare concentrated on the classes of people eligible for protection
from discrimination. Id. See also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74
(1992). Indeed, it took two decades for the Supreme Court to recognize the application of
Title IX to sexual harassment. Id.
19
See Cohen, supra note 1, at 313; see also 34 C.F.R. §106.40 (2007) (Title IX includes
protection against discrimination based on pregnancy and marital status); 34 C.F.R. §100.7
(2003) (incorporating the following retaliatory language taken from Title VII: “No recipient
or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any individual for
the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege . . . because he has made a complaint,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing
under this part.”). See also 34 C.F.R. §106.41 (2007). As the following excerpt demonstrates,
discrimination can extend to the availability of certain sports to each gender:
[A] recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of
each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill
or the activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient
operates or sponsors . . . no such team for members of the other sex,
and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously
been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out
for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For
the purposes of . . . [these Title IX regulations], contact sports include
boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other
sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.
Id.
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Education’s Title IX regulatory implementation scheme.20
The
regulations establish procedures that are important for the prevention or
correction of sexual harassment, including establishment of a public
policy against sex discrimination,21 adoption and publication of
grievance procedures addressing sex discrimination and harassment,22
and designation of at least one employee responsible for Title IX
compliance.23 Unfortunately, many colleges and universities have
focused on enacting reactive measures that allow the school to avoid

Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance [hereinafter Revised Guidance]: Harassment of
Students by School Employees, Other Students or Third Parties: Title IX, Department of
Education
Office
for
Civil
Rights,
Jan.
19,
2001,
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
See 20 U.S.C. § 3413 (2000). Since the passage of Title IX, Congress created a separate
federal agency responsible for education, the Department of Education, with an
enforcement division—the Office of Civil Rights. Id. Congress transferred all educational
responsibilities, which had belonged to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
to the newly created agency. Id. § 3441.
21
34 C.F.R. § 106.9 (2006). Such a policy must be publicly disseminated through
magazines, newspapers, and other memoranda distributed to students, teachers, coaches,
and other staff members. Id. This section of the C.F.R. states in part as follows:
Each recipient shall implement specific and continuing steps to notify
applicants for admission and employment, students and parents of
elementary and secondary school students, employees, sources of
referral of applicants for admission and employment, and all unions
or professional organizations holding collective bargaining or
professional agreements with the recipient, that it does not
discriminate on the basis of sex in the educational program or activity
which it operates, and that it is required by title IX and this part not to
discriminate in such a manner.
Id. 106.9(a)(1).
22
34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (2006). As the following section sets forth, a federal funds
recipient must designate a specific employee responsible for coordinating Title IX
compliance and provide formalized grievance procedures:
(a) Designation of responsible employee. Each recipient shall
designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply
with and carry out its responsibilities under this part, including any
investigation of any complaint communicated to such recipient
alleging its noncompliance with this part or alleging any actions
which would be prohibited by this part. The recipient shall notify all
its students and employees of the name, office address and telephone
number of the employee or employees appointed pursuant to this
paragraph.
(b) Complaint procedure of recipient. A recipient shall adopt and
publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable
resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action
which would be prohibited by this part.
Id. § 106.8(a)–(b).
23
Id. § 106.8(a). See supra note 22; infra Part IV (discussing the OCR recommendations in
comparison with this Note’s suggested additions).
20
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legal liability; however, these procedures are inadequate because they do
not take into account the existing power imbalances.24 The Department
of Education is the agency responsible for the enforcement of Title IX,
including enforcement in the hierarchical world of college athletics.25
In 2001, the Assistant Secretary of the OCR issued a Revised
Guidance providing standards for compliance that the OCR applies in
investigating Title IX sexual harassment claims and enforcing Title IX.26
This Guidance is intended to inform educational employees and officials
how to identify sexual harassment of a student and take steps to address
it.27 Finally, the Guidance provides ideal standards to be applied when
investigating or attempting to resolve a sexual harassment claim.28 In
1979, seven years after Title IX was passed, the Supreme Court first held
that like Title VII, Title IX could give rise to a private right of action.29
B. Broken Promises: Early Jurisprudential Interpretation of Title IX
1.

A Private Right of Action Extended to Sexual Harassment

In 1979, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court first
held that Title IX created a private right of action for sexual

24
See infra Part III.C (explaining the way in which the exploited Gebser standard
combines with a power imbalance in college athletics to allow institutions to enact reactive
policies that do not advance the purpose of Title IX).
25
20 U.S.C. §§ 3413, 3441.
26
Revised Guidance, supra note 20.
27
Id. The Guidance also gives a helpful description of the real purpose behind
preventing harassment:
Through its enforcement of Title IX, OCR has learned that a significant
number of students, both male and female, have experienced sexual
harassment, that sexual harassment can interfere with a student's
academic performance and emotional and physical well-being, and
that preventing and remedying sexual harassment in schools is
essential to ensure nondiscriminatory, safe environments in which
students can learn.
Id.
28
See Revised Guidance, supra note 20. In explaining harassment by teachers and other
employers, the Revised Guidance states, “Schools are responsible for taking prompt and
effective action to stop the harassment and prevent its recurrence.” Id. at V.B.1. The Court
limited the liability standards established in Gebser and Davis to private actions for
monetary damages. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998)
(setting the standard for school liability in private litigation); Davis v. Monroe County Bd.
Of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639 (1999) (clarifying the standard). Administrative enforcement
standards reflected in the 1997 and 2000 Revised Guidance remain valid in OCR
enforcement actions. Guidance, supra note 20, at Preamble.
29
See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing several of the Supreme Court cases to first interpret
Title IX).
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discrimination.30 The Court reasoned that Title IX had two related, yet
separate, objectives.31 First, Congress wanted to avoid using federal
monies to support discrimination.32 Second, Congress aimed to protect
individuals against sexual discrimination.33
The next pertinent decision in the Title IX line of cases is Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, a case considering the application of Title
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon, Justice Stevens wrote for the
majority and held that a woman who was denied admission to medical school at two
private universities had a private right of action under Title IX for sex-based
discrimination. Id. at 680, 717. The Court reasoned that Congress’s failure to specify a
private right to action did not mean that it did not intend for there to be such a remedy
available to the persons protected by Title IX. Id. at 717. In fact, all of the surrounding
circumstances that the Court has previously identified as supportive of an implied remedy
were present in this case, and the Court therefore found that the woman could maintain
her suit, even though the private right of action was not specifically enumerated in Title IX.
Id.
31
Id. at 704. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Coordination and Review
Section, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/titleix.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2008). The
United States Department of Justice states that “[t]he principle objective of Title IX is to
avoid the use of federal money to support sexually discriminatory practices in education
programs such as sexual harassment and employment discrimination, and to provide
individual citizens effective protection against those practices.” Id.
32
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Coordination
and Review Section, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/titleix.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2008). The administrative regulations further this goal as well, as Verna Williams, Vice
President and Director of Educational Opportunities at the National Women’s Law Center,
pointed out: “The new regulation is key to making the promise of Title IX a reality. It
provides the executive branch agencies with the tool they need to reach the persistent
problems that make gender equity elusive—like disparities in career education
programming and sexual harassment, for example.” Id.
33
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704. This was very similar to the reasons put forth for the private
cause of action in Title VI. Id. When speaking about Title VI, Representative Lindsay
commented,
Everything in this proposed legislation has to do with providing a
body of law which will surround and protect the individual from some
power complex. This bill is designed for the protection of individuals.
When an individual is wronged he can invoke the protection to
himself, but if he is unable to do so because of economic distress or
because of fear then the Federal Government is authorized to invoke
that individual protection for that individual[.]
110 Cong Rec. 1540 (1964). This should be compared with the following Title IX comments
made by Representative Mink regarding women as individuals with rights:
Any college or university which has [a] ... policy which discriminates
against women applicants . . . is free to do so under [Title IX] but such
institutions should not be asking the taxpayers of this country to pay
for this kind of discrimination. Millions of women pay taxes into the
Federal treasury and we collectively resent that these funds should be
used for the support of institutions to which we are denied equal
access.
177 Cong. Rec. 38252 (1971).
30
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IX to sexual harassment.34 In Franklin, teachers and administrators were
aware of student harassment by a teacher-coach but did nothing to stop
it, and even went so far as to discourage the victim from pursuing legal
remedies against the perpetrator.35 The Court framed the issue as
whether a high school student could seek monetary damages under Title
IX for alleged intentional gender-based discrimination in connection
with sexual harassment and abuse by a teacher-coach.36 The Court held
in the affirmative.37 Justice Scalia joined in the Court’s analysis of
Franklin, but wrote that when rights of action are judicially implied,
“categorical limitations . . . may be judicially implied as well.”38 Franklin,
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). Christine Franklin was a
high school student subjected to continual sexual harassment beginning in the fall of her
sophomore year by Andrew Hill, an athletics coach and teacher at the school. Id. at 63. The
case states that “Franklin avers that Hill engaged her in sexually-oriented conversations in
which he asked about her sexual experiences with her boyfriend and whether she would
consider having sexual intercourse with an older man.” Id. Franklin also alleged that “Hill
forcibly kissed her on the mouth in the school parking lot,” and that he called her at home
to ask her on a date. Id. Finally, the allegations included three occurrences during
Franklin’s junior year, in which Hill interrupted her class, requested that the teacher excuse
her, and forced Franklin to have sex with him in a private school office. Id. Although other
teachers and administrators had notice of, and in fact had already begun the investigation
of Hill, they did nothing to stop his sexual harassment and actually “discouraged Franklin
from pressing charges against Hill.” Id. at 64. Hill resigned from his position, and the
school thereupon closed its investigation. Id.
35
Id. The teacher-coach resigned, and the school dropped all investigation into the
matter. Id. Both the district and appeals courts dismissed charges before the Supreme
Court accepted certiorari from the Eleventh Circuit in 1992. Id. at 64–65. The Court found
that the damages available should not be limited to back-pay and prospective relief
because such remedies would be inadequate as the student no longer attended the school
and the teacher-coach no longer was employed at that school. Id. at 75–76.
36
Id. at 62–63. The Franklin majority repeatedly referred to the sanctioned relief as
“monetary damages[.]” Id. at 76. Although the Court did not define this term, it did
specifically reject limiting Title IX monetary relief to that which is equitable in nature, such
as compensation for back-pay. Id.
37
Id. at 62. The Court relied on established cases to hold that all appropriate remedies
should be available unless Congress has indicated otherwise. Id. at 66; see also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 670, 684 (1946). In Marbury, Chief Justice
Marshall noted that this government “has been emphatically termed a government of laws,
and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish
no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163. This idea dates
back to English common law. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES 23 (1783); see
also Ashby v. White, 1 Salk. 19, 21, Eng.Rep. 808, 816 (1702). In addition, the reasoning
used in Bell was nothing new, as from the earliest years of the judiciary, the power to
award damages to redress injuries in federal court has existed. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66. “As
Bell indicates, “[W]here legal rights have been invaded, . . . federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Bell, 327 U.S. at 684.
38
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 77–78 (Scalia, J., concurring). However, the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986 serve as an implicit acknowledgment that damages are available and
must be read “as a validation of Cannon’s holding[.]” Id. at 72 (quoting the majority). See
34
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when taken as a whole, stands for the proposition that “a damages
remedy is available for an action brought to enforce Title IX.”39 Franklin
was a precursor to Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, decided
eight years later, which announced a stiff standard to determine
institutional liability for sexual harassment in school or school-sponsored
extracurricular activities such as athletics.40
2.

Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District Sets the Standard for
Liability

Gebser was the next step in the Supreme Court’s Title IX
jurisprudence regarding when an institution may be held liable for
damages for an implied right of action under Title IX for sexual
harassment of a student by one of the institution’s teachers.41 The sexual
42 U.S.C. § 200d-7(a)(2). See also Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72. Justice Scalia points out that
Congress abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX, Title VI,
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. Id. It is on
this basis that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas concur in the final disposition of
the majority. Id. at 76. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575–76 (1979);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18, 23, Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72.
See also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988) (asserting that the Court perhaps
should abandon the whole idea of implied rights of action).
39
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the
difference between OCR agency enforcement and the standard for liability in private
litigation).
40
Cohen, supra note 1, at 328. See Revised Guidance, supra note 20. While the line of
cases addressed in this Note is concerned with monetary damages and injunctive relief for
the plaintiff, the Department of Education regulations have a slightly different purpose:
“In contrast, the process of administrative enforcement requires enforcement agencies such
as OCR to make schools aware of potential Title IX violations and to seek voluntary
corrective action before pursuing fund termination or other enforcement mechanisms.” Id.
at Preamble.
41
See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist, 524 U.S. 274 (1998). As a thirteen-year-old,
Alida Star Gebser participated in a book discussion club led by local high school teacher
Waldrop. Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1224 (5th Cir. 1997). Gebser
was a student at Lago Vista middle school, while Waldrop was a teacher at the Lago Vista
high school. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277. Gebser participated in these book discussions because
she was intellectually ahead of her class and Waldrop’s wife was her eighth grade teacher,
who suggested she meet with her husband’s group. Doe, 106 F.3d at 1223. During the
course of these meetings, Waldrop made sexually suggestive comments to the group of
students. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277. The next fall, when Gebser had Waldrop as a teacher, he
continued to make sexually suggestive comments to the class, and to Gebser in particular
when they were alone in his classroom. Id. at 77–78. Waldrop initiated actual sexual
contact with Gebser in the spring, kissing her and fondling her while at her house under
the pretense of returning a book. Id. at 278. The two had sexual intercourse a number of
times over the remainder of that year, the summer, and into the next school year. Id. They
often had sex during class time, although never on school property. Id. at 279-80. The
focus of the Gebser decision was which standard should be applied in determining liability
in teacher-student harassment cases. Id. The topic of student sexual harassment has also
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harassment at issue in this case took place in the context of book
discussions and was reported by several classroom parents to the school
guidance counselor, but not to the superintendent who was also the Title
IX coordinator.42 A few months later, a police officer discovered the
teacher in question and a student having sex; the teacher was arrested
and Lago Vista terminated his employment.43
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that school districts are not
liable for a Title IX violation unless an employee with supervisory power
over the offending employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power
to end it, and failed to do so.44 At that time, there were many different
existing methods for assessing a school district’s liability under Title IX
for a teacher’s abuse of a student; however, this was one of the most
restrictive methods.45
been extensively discussed in scholarly works and cases. See, e.g., Rowinsky v. Bryan
Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447
(9th Cir. 1995); Daniel B. Tukel, Student Versus Student: School District Liability for Peer
Sexual Harassment, 75 MICH. BAR J. 1154 (1996).
42
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278. Gebser did not report this activity to school officials, stating
that she did not want to lose Waldrop as a teacher. Id. Later that year, two parents of other
students complained to the high school principal about Waldrop’s comments during class.
Id. Waldrop was reprimanded by school officials and apologized to the parents, saying he
did not think he had said anything offensive but promised it would not happen again. Id.
See Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at IX. The Guidance given by the Department of
Education indicates that each school system should have Title IX Coordinator, responsible
for implementing and overseeing any Title IX programs. Id. See infra Parts III.C (analyzing
existing policies); Part IV.B (proposing additional procedures and proactive measures).
43
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278. As the dissent emphasized, this case presents a clear example
of abuse that was made possible, effectuated, and repeated over a prolonged period
because of the powerful influence that Waldrop had over Gebser by reason of the authority
that the school district had delegated to him. Id. at 299 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra
Part II.B (discussing power structures in athletics).
44
Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997). The Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist. Court’s reasoning regarding liability was based on Rosa H. v. San Elizario
Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997). Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d at 1225–
26. In affirming the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the school district, the
Fifth Circuit held that neither a vicarious agency liability theory nor a strict liability theory
was the proper standard for determining a school’s liability for teacher-student
harassment. Id. See also Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 1996)
(the Fifth Circuit held a school district is not absolutely liable because strict liability is not
part of the Title IX contract). The court continued, in opposition to a strong dissent and
contrary to OCR policy, that a school district was not liable for the sexual molestation of a
second grade student by one of her teachers because the student and her mother only
reported the harassment to the student’s homeroom teacher. Id. It further determined that
notice to the teacher was not notice to the school—notwithstanding the fact that a school
handbook instructed students and parents to report complaints to the child’s homeroom
teacher. Id.
45
Cohen, supra note 1, at 328; see also Kinman v. Omaha Public Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463,
468–69 (8th Cir. 1996) (summarizing the four standards of Title IX liability used by various
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gebser, and
Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority in a five to four decision.46 The
Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and laid out the applicable
standard, holding that “damages may not be recovered in those
circumstances unless an official of the school district who at a minimum
has authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf has
actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s
misconduct.”47 The majority reaffirmed that, in Title IX jurisprudence,
the private right of remedy is judicially implied and there is no
expressed legislative intention on the scope of remedies available.48
Therefore, a court has a measure of latitude in deciding these issues.49
district courts in 1996: “(1) agency principles of negligence or recklessness; (2) knowledge
or direct involvement by the school district; (3) Title VII's ‘knew or should have known’
standard; and (4) strict liability.”). See generally Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128
F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997) (in which the Seventh Circuit refused to impute a teacher’s actions
to a School District or School Board, applying an actual knowledge standard); Kracunas v.
Iona Coll., 119 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that both actual and constructive notice
requirements exist for purposes of imposing Title IX liability on a college or university for
sexual harassment); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 513–15 (6th Cir. 1996)
(discussing the supervisory liability standard used in dismissal of Title IX claims).
46
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284. See Richard L. Wiener & Linda A. Hunt, Clarifying Cases of
Sexual Harassment, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N MONITOR ONLINE at 12, (Dec. 1998),
available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/dec98/jnotehtml. See also U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Civil Rights Division Title IX Legal Manual, Jan. 11, 2001, Pt. IV.D.2. In one term, the
United States Supreme Court held that employers were strictly liable for supervisors who
committed sexual harassment, while at the same time narrowed the protection available for
students who file similar claims. Id. As civil rights law has evolved, the definition of sexual
harassment has remained largely the same under Title VII and Title IX, but the legal
standards for determining liability for monetary damages under the two statutes are
different. Id. Under Title IX, a school must be deliberately indifferent in the face of actual
knowledge of the harassment in order to be liable. Id. In contrast, under Title VII, an
employer may be liable for money damages, under certain circumstances, for a
supervisor’s harassment of a subordinate, even without notice. Id. Cf. Meritor Sav. Bank
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (holding that absence of notice to an employer does
not insulate the employer from liability).
47
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added). In addition, “[w]here a school district's
liability rests on actual notice principles, however, the knowledge of the wrongdoer himself
is not pertinent to the analysis.” Id. at 291. But see Gebser, 524 U.S. at 299 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“The fact that he did not prevent his own harassment of Gebser is the
consequence of his lack of will, not his lack of authority.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 280
(The Court seems to leave the door open for Congress to act,
proclaiming, “Until Congress speaks directly on the subject, however, we will not hold a
school district liable for damages under Title IX for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a
student absent actual notice and deliberate indifference.”) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292–
93); see infra Part IV (proposing changes to the standard for liability under Title IX).
48
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.
49
Id. This scope of remedies includes monetary damages. Id. The dissent takes issue
with this proposition, writing that to take “a measure of latitude” is to warp the Court’s
duty to interpret the law. Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined in
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The Court looked to the language of the statute and put great emphasis
on the contractual structure of Title IX as compared to Title VII.50
Whereas Title VII concentrates on making individuals whole after past
discrimination, the Court recognized that Title IX aims to protect
individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by federally
funded educational programs.51 However, the Court reasoned that there
must be a limit to liability because when a school accepts federal funds, it
agrees to not discriminate on the basis of sex; however, the court also
held that it is unlikely that a school agrees to be liable if one of its
employees discriminates.52 The Gebser Court held that Congress did not
intend to imply an enforcement scheme that would allow “greater
liability without comparable conditions.”53
In the absence of any further direction from Congress, the Court
interpreted Title IX’s implied damages remedy as it did the express
remedy, by holding that both are predicated upon notice to an
appropriate person who has an opportunity to end the discrimination:

his dissent by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. These Justices found that the
Court should not be involved in revising Congressional legislation. Id. The dissent
continues to quote Cannon, “‘[We have no doubt that Congress intended to create Title IX
remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as
authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited
discrimination[.]’” Id. at 293–94 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694–98). Because an implicit
Congressional command has the same legal effect as an explicit one, and Title IX has been
construed as having an implicit right to private cause of action, the Court should seek
guidance from the text of the statute rather than from its own ideas of public policy. Id. at
296.
50
Id. at 286.
51
Id. at 287. In addition, Title IX is a Spending Clause statute, and Congress would not
have envisioned a federal funds recipient to be liable based on a concept as abstract as
constructive notice or respondeat superior for an employee’s (teacher, coach,
administrator) act of sexually harassing a student. Id.
52
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Ind. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th Cir. 1997). This reasoning
highlights the different standards used to ascertain liability under Title VII. See supra note
45 (discussing different possible standards used to determine school liability).
53
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. However, Justice Ginsburg composed a dissent that focused
on enforcement and highlighted the importance of a school’s sexual harassment prevention
policy. Id. at 306–07. She drew from the tort doctrine of avoidable consequences in
writing:
I would recognize as an affirmative defense to a Title IX charge of
sexual harassment, an effective policy for reporting and redressing
such misconduct. School districts subject to Title IX's governance have
been instructed by the Secretary of Education to install procedures for
“‘prompt and equitable resolution’” of complaints, 34 CFR § 106.8(b)
(1997), and the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights has
detailed elements of an effective grievance process, with specific
reference to sexual harassment, 62 Fed.Reg. 12034, 12044–12045 (1997).
Id.
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[W]e hold that a damages remedy will not lie under Title
IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to
address the alleged discrimination and to institute
corrective measures on the recipient's behalf has actual
knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's programs
and fails adequately to respond. 54
In addition, this failure to respond must be an attitude of “deliberate
indifference” to the discrimination at hand.55
In Gebser, the teacher’s conduct was clearly intentional and it
“occurred during, and as a part of, a curriculum activity in which he
wielded authority over . . . [the student] that had been delegated to him
by . . . [the school district].”56 While the majority did not deny that
Gebser alleged an intentional violation as laid out in Franklin, the Court
still held that the law did not provide a damages remedy for the Title IX
violation alleged by Gebser because, while the guidance counselor was
notified of the harassment, the appropriate officials did not have actual
notice of Waldrop’s behavior.57
The dissent disagreed with the
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. On the other hand, the Gebser dissent written by Justice
Stevens references the earlier Franklin decision in comparing sexual harassment of a
subordinate by a supervisor, to that of the harassment of a student by a teacher. Id. at 297.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). This reasoning has been used in numerous instances since Gebser.
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that Title IX places the duty on a school not to
discriminate, and when a supervisor harasses a subordinate because of his or her sex, that
is discrimination based on sex. Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty, Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75
(1992)). The dissent emphasizes that the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually
harasses or abuses a student. Id. The dissent continues, “Congress surely did not intend for
federal moneys to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe.”
Id. (quoting Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75). Therefore, for the dissent, Franklin stands for the
proposition that by accepting the federal funds, the school district assumes a duty to not
discriminate on the basis of sex, and that sexual harassment of a student by a teacher
violates that duty. See id.
55
Id. at 290 (majority opinion). Comparable considerations led to the adoption of a
deliberate indifference standard for claims under § 1983 against municipal entities. See,
e.g., Bd. of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 388–92 (1989); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123–24 (1992). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2000), a civil rights statute providing a civil action for deprivation of rights. But see
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 304 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The only decisions the Court cites to
support its adoption of such a stringent standard are cases arising under a quite different
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
56
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 298. The curriculum was partially funded with federal funds. Id.;
see also infra note 71 (discussing an instance in which a high school soccer coach abused the
authority that the school had delegated to him).
57
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 298. The appropriate official would be one with “authority to
institute corrective measure on the district’s behalf[.]” Id. See infra Part III.A.1 (examining
who is the appropriate official in the context of athletics to receive notice that harassment is
occurring).
54

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/12

Schroeder: Power Imbalances in College Athletics and an Exploited Standard:

2009]

Title IX and College Athletics

1497

majority’s reasoning and pointed out that Waldrop was empowered by
the school and was able to continue his abuse of Gebser because of his
school-sanctioned authority over the students.58
This initial
establishment of the standard for institutional liability under Title IX was
further elucidated in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.59
C. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education Clarifies the Standard
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education did not deal with
harassment by an employee of the school, but rather with student-onstudent harassment.60 The Supreme Court held that when a teacher or
coach sexually harasses a student, that employee discriminates on the
basis of sex in violation of Title IX.61 Justice O’Connor wrote for the
majority and emphasized in her background that the hierarchical power
structure at the school influenced the harassment liability.62 The Court
held for the petitioner and clarified the standard put forth in Gebser.63
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 299. The dissent emphasizes a conflict with agency law, under
which the school is responsible for Waldrop's misconduct because of the existence of the
agency relationship between Waldrop and the school that aided him in accomplishing the
tort. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957) (discussing agency
law). Waldrop exercised a great amount of control because he was a secondary teacher.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 299. Waldrop’s misuse of the authority given to him by the school
allowed him to abuse the trust of his young student. Id. See generally infra Part III.C
(discussing the intense power imbalance that exists in athletics).
59
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
60
Id. Petitioner filed suit on her daughter’s behalf, claiming that the continued sexual
harassment had interfered with her daughter’s education and that the school officials’
deliberate indifference had created a hostile environment in violation of Title IX. Id. at 636.
In Monroe County Board of Education, the petitioner was a fifth grade girl who had been
harassed by a classmate over an extended period of time. Id. at 633. On separate occasions,
the student and the mother reported the harassment to the student’s teacher. Id. at 634.
The teacher allegedly assured the mother that this behavior had been reported to the school
principal, but no disciplinary actions were taken, and the harasser was not separated from
the victim, which allowed the harasser to continue harassing the female student over the
course of several months. Id. At the time of these events, the Monroe County School Board
had not established a policy on sexual harassment. Id. at 635. In fact, the school board had
given no instruction to its personnel on how to respond to or report peer sexual
harassment. Id.
61
Id. at 660. This Note deals, in general, with hostile environment sexual harassment;
another theory is quid pro quo harassment that occurs when some benefit or punishment
depends upon the satisfaction of sexual demands. See, e.g., Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d
20 (1st Cir. 1999) (quid pro quo sexual harassment claim). See Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Both forms of sexual harassment are now accorded similar
treatment under federal law. See id.
62
Davis, 526 U.S. at 646. The Court described the power structure by stating, “In these
circumstances, the recipient retains substantial control over the context in which the
harassment occurs. More importantly, however, in this setting the Board exercises
significant control over the harasser.” Id. See infra Part III.B (exploring the ways power
58
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The strict standard for sexual harassment liability is clear: only
when a recipient of federal funding had actual notice of and was
deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment is that recipient liable for
monetary damages.64 In addition, the harassment must be “so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the
victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by
the school.”65 This is a difficult standard, especially given that additional
limitations are imposed, for example, recipients of federal funds may be
held liable under Title IX for their own actions.66
The Davis Court recognized that the standard set by Gebser was an
exacting one by commenting that it “sought to eliminate any ‘risk that
the recipient would be liable in damages not for its own official decision
but instead for its employees' independent actions.’”67 In addition,
recipients can be held liable only when their deliberate indifference to
harassment effectively caused the discrimination.68
imbalances contribute to the development of an environment vulnerable to sexual
harassment).
63
Davis, 526 U.S. at 654.
64
Cohen, supra note 1, at 336. Cohen discusses this standard in reference to its
application to sexual discrimination that is not necessarily harassment. Id.
65
Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. A dissent, written by Justice Kennedy, expressed concern that
this standard is not sufficient to distinguish student-student harassment cases from simple
childish teasing (even based on gender) and actionable sexual harassment. Id. at 676
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy cautions that in student-student harassment
cases this standard may “stigmatize children as sexual harassers[.]” Id. at 674 (quoting
Brief for Respondents 12–13).
66
Id. at 640. Here, petitioner was attempting to hold the school liable for its inaction
because it was aware of and did nothing to punish the student perpetrator or to protect the
victim. Id. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (holding that a recipient
of federal education funds may be held liable for teacher-student harassment if the
recipient was deliberately indifferent to the sexual harassment). See generally Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (requiring that funding recipients
have notice of their potential liability for monetary damages); Guardians Ass. v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 597–98 (1983) (concluding that Pennhurst does not
bar a Title VII private damages action when the federal funding recipient intentionally
engages in conduct that violates Title VII).
67
Davis, 526 U.S. at 643 (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91). See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825 (1994). Interestingly, a few years earlier, the Supreme Court considered what type
of conduct constituted deliberate indifference in the prison context when an inmate
brought suit based on a prison official’s violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. The
Court determined that a school district may escape liability if it can show “that [it] did not
know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that [it was]
therefore unaware of a danger, or that [it] knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit
unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.” Id.
at 843–44.
68
Davis, 526 U.S. at 642 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291). See also City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378 (1989) (recognizing liability under § 1983 only if the municipality itself causes
the violation).
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Deliberate

A funding recipient’s deliberate indifference to sexual harassment
must be a part of the theory of liability under Title IX when the federally
funded institution has control over the harassment situation.69 For the
recipient to have control over the situation, the harassment must take
place in a context subject to the school district’s control.70 In addition, to
be liable under Title IX the recipient must have the authority to take
remedial action to address the harassment.71 The deliberate indifference
standard means that, at a minimum, the school’s inaction must cause
students to undergo sexual harassment or make them vulnerable to it.72
The dissent in Davis cautioned that there must be a limitation to
what type of third party conduct could be attributed to the school.73 It
questioned the majority’s line of reasoning, which posited the idea that
“one causes discrimination when one has some ‘degree of control’ over
the discrimination and fails to remedy it.”74 This idea of causation could
Davis, 526 U.S. at 644. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 788 (8th ed. 2004). BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY defines deliberate indifference as “[t]he careful preservation of one's ignorance
despite awareness of circumstances that would put a reasonable person on notice of a fact
essential to a crime.” Id.
70
Davis, 526 U.S. at 645. When the misconduct occurs during the school day and
happens on school grounds, the harassment is taking place under the operation of the
recipient of funding. Id. In Davis, the school had control not only over the general situation
under which the harassment occurred but also over the harasser. Id.
71
Id. at 644. See, e.g., Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d 479 (6th Cir.
2006). Although Title IX was enforceable through a private cause of action for sexual
harassment, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the school or the
administrators had actual notice or were deliberately indifferent to the coach’s sexual
harassment of the girls’ high school soccer team as required for monetary remedies. Id.
The court held that even though a group of parents had complained to the assistant
principal, who held a meeting with the coach, the athletic director, and the principal, the
administration did not have actual notice. Id. at 484–85. In a case against the University of
Georgia Board of Regents, a claim against the Board of Regents was dismissed because the
plaintiff failed to allege that the president-elect had authority to take action to change the
policies of the Board. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Geor., 477 F.3d 1282,
1293–95 (11th Cir. 2007). However, in a claim against the University of Georgia Athletic
Association, the court held that the same president-elect, who was serving as president of
the athletic association, was the appropriate person to receive notice. Id.
72
Davis, 526 U.S. at 645. This is similar to the deliberate indifference standard the
Supreme Court adopted in section 1983 claims that allege that the cause of the violation
was the state’s failure to prevent the deprivation of rights. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. See Bd.
of Comm’rs of Bryan County. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
388–92 (1989); see also Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123–24 (1992) (examining a
section 1983 claim).
73
Davis, 526 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74
Id. at 662. The dissent continues to label the majority’s test an exercise in “arbitrary
line-drawing.” Id.
69
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lead to unbalanced results when comparing liability between teacherstudent harassment and student-student harassment.75
Many lower courts have looked to Davis to clarify what exactly the
deliberate indifference standard means.76
In addition to the
aforementioned elements, the federal funds recipient must make an
official decision to not remedy the situation.77 The next prong of the
standard implicates the power hierarchy in college athletics, as an
appropriate official must receive “actual notice.”78
Id. at 679. In his dissent in Davis, Justice Kennedy puts forward an intriguing
hypothetical that demonstrates the disjuncture between student-student harassment and
teacher-student harassment:
In the context of teacher harassment, the Gebser notice standard
imposes some limit on school liability. Where peer harassment is the
discrimination, however, it imposes no limitation at all. In most cases
of student misbehavior, it is the teacher who has authority, at least in
the first instance, to punish the student and take other measures to
remedy the harassment. The anomalous result will be that, while a
school district cannot be held liable for a teacher's sexual harassment
of a student without notice to the school board (or at least to the
principal), the district can be held liable for a teacher's failure to
remedy peer harassment. The threshold for school liability, then,
appears to be lower when the harasser is a student than when the
harasser is a teacher who is an agent of the school. The absurdity of
this result confirms that it was neither contemplated by Congress nor
anticipated by the States.
Id. at 679–80.
76
See, e.g., Hart v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., 2002 WL 31951264 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648) (the Southern District of Ohio has noted that, per Davis, in
order to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard, a plaintiff must show that the school
district’s response was “clearly unreasonable” in light of the situation).
77
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. The Court explains that the standard of deliberate indifference
has a rough parallel in an “administrative enforcement scheme [that] presupposes that an
official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient
into compliance.” Id. The Court compares the deliberate indifference standard to a lower
standard, where there would be the danger that a federal funds recipient could be held
liable for not only its own official decisions and actions, but also for its employees’
independent actions. Id.
78
Id. at 299. In Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, university officials were aware
of several incidents of sexual assaults and sexual harassment by specific football players
over four years. 500 F.3d. 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). The District Court ruled that this did not
constitute adequate notice that females faced a risk of harassment or assault by the football
team at recruiting parties and granted summary judgment for the University of Colorado
Boulder. Id. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment,
but also held that the actual notice standard did not apply because it was a question of an
official policy. Id. See also Rost v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. App. Lexis
177 (Jan. 4, 2008) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282) (on these facts, to impose liability on the
school district would effectively hold it responsible for what it “should have known” about
harassment but failed to uncover and eliminate). See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. That is not the
duty Congress intended to impose by Title IX, which was enacted solely to respond to
sexual harassment about which school officials have “actual knowledge[.]” Id.
75
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A school district cannot be held liable for a teacher’s or coach’s
sexual harassment of a student unless an official of the school, with a
minimal level of authority to institute remedial measures, has “actual
notice” of the misconduct.79 In his dissent to the decision in Davis,
Justice Kennedy found it “telling” that the majority did not explicitly lay
out which school officials qualify to receive this notice.80 Since the Court
issued its decision in Gebser, courts have applied this standard
differently.81 In fact, many courts have looked to pre-Gebser cases to
determine who, within a school or school district, ought to qualify as the
appropriate person to receive actual notice in order to trigger school
liability.82
The majority in Gebser reasoned that “Title IX contains important
clues that Congress did not intend to allow recovery in damages where
liability rests solely on principles of vicarious liability or constructive
notice.”83 In addition, the majority found that it would actually
Davis, 526 U.S. at 647. In addition, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 establishes that the federal
government may not terminate funding until it has “advised the appropriate person or
persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance
cannot be secured by voluntary means.” 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
80
Davis, 526 U.S. at 679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Rosa H. v. San Elizario Ind.
Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997) (a pre-Gebser case that formulated a standard similar
to Gebser in that it required actual notice to a school official who was invested by the school
board with supervisory power over the offending employee).
81
Thomas Keefe, Annotation, Right of Action Under Title IX of Education Amendments Act
of 1972 (20 U.S.C.A. § 1681) Against School or School District for Sexual Harassment of Student
by Student's Teacher or Other School District Employee, 197 A.L.R. Fed. 289 § 2(b) (2004).
Compare Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F.Supp. 867, 876 (M.D.Ga.1993) (“This court finds no basis
for plaintiffs’ Title IX claim. Assuming that [the school security guard’s] assaults on
plaintiffs constitute discrimination based upon sex, the Board had no part in this
discrimination.”), with Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 659 (positing the idea that liability might arise
whenever any school employee is aware of the harassment).
82
Keefe, supra note 81, at § 2(b). Rosa H. finds a middle ground, balancing the
meaningful tort liability envisioned by the earlier decisions with the accepted
interpretation that Title IX only provides for liability for an intentional act. 106 F.3d at 659–
60. That court held that a school district may be held liable for teacher-student Title IX
harassment “only if a school official who had actual knowledge of the abuse was invested
by the school board with the duty to supervise the employee and the power to take action
that would end such abuse and failed to do so.” Id. at 660. This standard would exclude
from liability other teachers, coaches, and janitors unless they have been specifically
assigned a supervisory role with the power to halt abuse. Id. This standard mirrors the
Title VII standard for when an employer’s knowledge of workplace harassment subjects an
employer to liability. Id.
83
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288. The Court looked to Title VII legislation, which provided for
an express right of action but did not include recovery for monetary damages; instead the
legislation limited recovery to injunctive and equitable relief. Id. at 289. See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a-3(a) (1970 ed.); § 2000e-(b), 5(e), (g) (1970 ed., Supp. II). Even though Congress did
79
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“frustrate the purposes” of Title IX to allow recovery for damages under
a theory of respondeat superior or constructive notice; thus, actual notice
to an official is required.84
Therefore, the Court restricted the
opportunities for recovery and hindered the ultimate goal of Title IX
under the guise of protecting the purpose of Title IX.85
Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder was a recent occurrence in
which a court restricted the idea of notice; in Simpson, several women
alleged that University of Colorado officials were aware of the football
program creating an atmosphere during parties for recruits that involved
harassing women.86 The circuit court found the Gebser notice standard
did not apply to the University of Colorado because the issue was not
whether notice was received by the institution; rather, it was whether the
claim involved official policy that encouraged the harassment.87
However, the Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit repeated the
underlying principle that liability should be restricted to only intentional
actions made by the institution.88 Here, the court narrowly construed the
issue and determined that actual notice does not include the existence of

provide for damages when it amended Title VII in 1991, it limited recovery according to the
size of the employer. Id. at §2000e- (b); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285–86; Rosa H., 106 F.3d
at 660. The agency theory and Title VII’s constructive-notice theory were also rejected
because both violated the established principle that penalties for a failure to comply with
conditions on the disbursement of Spending Clause funds are contractual in nature. Rosa
H., 106 F.3d at 660; see Davis, 526 U.S. at 640 (“[P]rivate damages actions are available only
where recipients of federal funding had adequate notice that they could be liable for the
conduct at issue[.]”); Pennhurst, 451 U.S at 17 (“There can. . . be no knowing acceptance [of
the terms of the contract] if a State is unaware of the conditions [imposed by the legislation
on its receipt of funds].”).
84
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285. Title IX is fundamentally different than Title VII because while
Title VII is intended to “compensate victims of discrimination, Title IX focuses more on
‘protecting’ individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal
funds.” Id. at 287.
85
See also Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 165 (1996) (a decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that a school
is not liable under Title IX even if it is on notice of peer-to-peer sexual harassment and
ignores it or fails to remedy it, unless it responds differently based on the sex of the alleged
victim).
86
Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d. 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 2007). See
supra note 78 (discussing in further detail the facts of Simpson).
87
Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290). Cf. Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist.
Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1022–27 (noting that the notice standard for schools in Title IX
sexual harassment claim is higher than the notice standard for employers under Title VII).
88
Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178. This was a disappointment to Title IX activists, as some felt
that “‘if the overall environment at a school can serve as actual notice (of sexual
harassment), that would be new.’” Erik Brady, Colorado Scandal Could Hit Home to Other
Colleges, USA TODAY, May 5, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/
football/big12/2004-05-26-colorado-cover_x.htm.
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an official policy.89 Specifically, even if the appropriate official has actual
notice and is not deliberately indifferent, the harassment in question
must also rise to a particular level before a Title IX claim will be allowed.
3.

Harassment That Is Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive—
Jennings Demonstrates the Standard in Athletics90

Whether gender-oriented sexual harassment amounts to actionable
(severe or pervasive) Title IX discrimination “depends on a constellation
of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships.”91 Courts
examine all circumstances, including the positions of the harasser and
the victim, the ages of both, whether the harassment was severe,
frequent, physically intimidating, or humiliating, and whether it
deprived the student of educational or athletic opportunities.92 Courts
Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178. Interestingly, a pre-Gebser case was prophetic in predicting
the position the courts would take on what constitutes proper notice. See Rosa H. v. San
Elizario Ind. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997) There, the Fifth Circuit Court held that
the fifteen-year-old student whose karate instructor had repeatedly initiated sexual
intercourse with him was sexually harassed, but that a school district is only liable if a
school official, who had actual knowledge of abuse, was vested by the school board with
the duty to supervise the instructor and the power to take action that would end such
abuse and failed to do so. Id.
90
See Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650
(1999). Just as Jennings presents the standard for severe harassment in athletics, the Court
in Davis envisions an example of this standard in the classroom. See id. A clear example of
student-student harassment that would trigger a damages claim under this standard
would be one involving the overt, physical deprivation of access to school resources. Id.
An example used by the Davis court involves boys in a class making fun of and threatening
girls everyday, thereby preventing the girls from using a certain computer lab. Id. at 651.
If the district administrators are aware of the boys’ conduct, yet do nothing, their inaction
would be considered pervasive enough to establish an actionable claim. Id. However,
actual physical exclusion from an educational resource is not necessary; instead, actionable
harassment can be any harassment that is so severe that it detracts from the victims’
education so that they are denied equal access to institutional resources. Id. The broad
purpose of Title IX is to equalize opportunities for both sexes in education and educational
extracurricular activities. See supra Part II.A (discussing the legislative intent behind Title
IX).
91
Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 696 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at
651). Jennings emphasizes the importance of power imbalance in making a determination
about whether a claim is actionable. Id. See also supra Part III.B (investigating the power
imbalance).
92
Jennings, 482 F.3d at 696. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993). Harris
is a Title VII case in which the Court held that while the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited
conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person’s psychological well-being, the
statute was not limited to such conduct. Id. The Court held that as long as the
environment could reasonably be perceived as hostile or abusive, it did not have to inflict
psychological injury. Id. at 23. In addition, whether an environment is hostile or abusive
can be determined only by looking at all the existing circumstances. Id. This can include,
but is not limited to “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
89
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also consider whether the harassment creates an “‘environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive’” and that the victim
herself feels is abusive.93 However, a hostile environment may exist even
without obvious tangible injury to the student.94 For example, while the
Supreme Court has not decided the issue, the OCR has held that a
student may be able to remain on a sports team, despite feeling
humiliated or angered by harassment.95 Regardless of the OCR’s
holding, harassing conduct of this type alters the student's educational
environment on the basis of sex and therefore violates Title IX.96 An
athletic environment is highly susceptible to becoming hostile because of
the physical and emotional closeness it involves.97
In fact, “there is ‘little doubt that the enactment was aimed, in part,
at creating a more level playing field for female athletes;]’” therefore it is
also necessary to examine player-coach relationships within this

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Id.
93
Jennings, 482 F.3d at 696 (quoting Davis, 510 U.S. at 21). Courts should use common
sense and an appropriate sensitivity to the social context to differentiate between behavior
as either sexual harassment or just “‘[s]imple teasing, offhand comments, [or] isolated
incidents[.]’” Id. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
94
See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (holding that tangible harm is not required for the
harassment to rise to the level of severity sufficient to induce institutional liability).
95
Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, n.51 (1997), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/docs/sexhar01.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2008) (citing to Summerfield Schools, OCR
Case No. 15-92-1029).
96
Notice of Publication of Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12041 (1997). Behavior that,
outside of the athletic environment, might be objectionable may not rise to the level of
sexual harassment on a sports team. See Jennings, 482 F.3d at 698 (“A male coach might use
sexual slang in front of his women players, and the players might do the same in front of
the coach. Title IX is not a civility code for the male coach who coaches women, and it is not
meant to punish such a coach for off-color language that is not aimed to degrade or
intimidate.”).
97
See infra Part III.B (examining the power imbalance). Davis, 526 U.S at 678 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Davis criticized the utility of this prong of the
standard. Id. Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Court's reliance on the impact on the
victim’s education suggests that the objective offensiveness of a comment is to be judged by
reference to a reasonable child or other young person, a standard that is likely to be quite
expansive. Id. This standard also gives juries no real guidance, but instead requires them
to attempt to gauge the sensitivities of an average child. Id. See Wiener, supra note 46. In
addition, the psychological community found the standard to be appalling; one
commentator noted “[a]pparently, the Court assumed that young girls and boys are mature
and thoughtful enough to expose sexual misconduct to high-ranking school authorities.”
Id. See Jennings, 482 F.3d at 716 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). On the other hand, many courts
have held that this standard is not intended to be a “general civility code.” Id.; see also
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
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context.98 Jennings v. University of North Carolina illustrates how a coach
created an environment that was hostile to his female athletes.99 The
coach allegedly made sexually charged comments to the team,
questioned team members about their sex lives in graphic detail, and
made explicit sexual references to several players’ anatomical features.100
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc, held that the plaintiff had
proffered facts that were sufficient for a jury to find that the coach’s
sexually harassing conduct was degrading and pervasive enough to
create a hostile environment and therefore denied the school’s motion
for summary judgment.101 Thus, the case was a victory in the Fourth
Circuit for Title IX advocates, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari;
therefore, the Court missed an opportunity to establish national
precedent for institutional liability under Title IX.102 In sum, the Court
failed to contemplate that its Title IX holdings would “render inutile

Karen Fadulto, Can the Concept of “Good Coaching” Be Quantified for the Purposes of Title
IX Sex Discrimination Claims? 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS & CONTEMP. PROBS. 220, 225 (2006)
(quoting Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993). Fadulto indicates that
Congress’s use of the language “any education program or activity” in Title IX has been
interpreted as showing Congress’s intent to use Title IX to improve equality in athletics. Id.
at 224 (citing Haffer v. Temple Univ. of Commonwealth System of Higher Educ., 678
F.Supp. 517, 541 (D. Pa. 1988)).
99
Jennings, 482 F.3d at 686. See also infra Part III.B (discussing the ubiquitous power
imbalance that exists in college athletics on both male and female teams).
100
Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697. Specifically, one player testified that her coach’s comments
made her “fe[el] dirty’” and “‘made [her] skin crawl’” and another stated that she felt
pressured because of his excessive intrusion into all of the players’ sex lives. Id. The
coach’s comments allegedly carried overtones of vulgarity and promiscuity. Id. at 692–94.
101
Id. at 698–99. Judge Niemeyer issued a scathing dissent in the Jennings case, stating
that the majority had actually interpreted Davis incorrectly. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 718–19
(Neimeyer, J., dissenting). Judge Niemeyer claimed the majority ignored the requirement
of Title IX liability that the conduct in question “deprive a plaintiff of ‘equal access to an
institution's resources and opportunities.’” Id. at 718 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 651).
Contrary to the majority’s reading of Davis, the dissent contended that the Supreme Court
has held many times that Title IX's discrimination requirement is satisfied “only where [the
harassment is so severe or pervasive] that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Jennings, 482 F.3d at 718
(emphasis in original) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 654). Niemeyer continued to blast the
majority in its interpretation of the standard. Id. Instead of utilizing the correct standard,
Niemeyer claims the majority used a watered down “negative impact” test and therefore
found that the coach’s conduct may have caused a negative impact of some sort. Id. at 719
(showing the difficulty and variety of ways the standard has been interpreted by different
courts).
102
See also Simpson, 500 F.3d. 1170. Several women alleged that Colorado University was
aware that the football team’s recruiting program created an atmosphere that involved
harassing women during parties for its recruits, but the court found this was insufficient
notice. Id. at 1173.
98
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causes of action authorized by Congress [by deciding] that no remedy is
available.”103
III. ANALYSIS OF THE INHERENT POWER IMBALANCES AND THE EASILY
TWISTED STANDARD, WHICH ENCOURAGE THE FORMULATION OF MERELY
REACTIVE INSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Since 1972, numerous decisions by federal court judges have twisted
Title IX so that it no longer serves the purpose that Senator Bayh
envisioned.104 Unfortunately, it seems that the Gebser dissent was
prophetic when it foretold that few Title IX plaintiffs who were victims
of intentional discrimination or harassment would be able to recover
damages under the exceedingly high standard established by the
majority decision.105 The Gebser standard has been distorted to allow
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74 (emphasis in original). See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 306 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent in Gebser that focused on an affirmative
defense for schools. Id. Justices Souter and Breyer joined Ginsburg in this dissent, in which
Ginsburg noted that she would accept an effective policy for reporting and redressing Title
IX sexual harassment as a defense. Id. at 307. The dissent pointed out that school districts
that receive federal funding have already been instructed to prepare procedures for prompt
and equitable resolution of complaints. See id.; 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (1997). The Department
of Education has also issued regulations on the dissemination of such procedures. See 34
C.F.R. § 106.9 (1997). See also Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 95 at n.56. The
Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Education issued a policy stating that a school
district is liable under Title IX if one of its teachers “was aided in carrying out the sexual
harassment of students by his or her position of authority with the institution.” Id. See 34
C.F.R. § 106.8 (2007). The Department of Education has also promulgated the elements of
what an effective grievance process looks like, with specific reference to sexual harassment.
Id. In her dissent in Gebser, Justice Ginsburg wrote that, under such a scheme, the burden
would be on the school district to show that these types of procedures were easily available
and would have redressed the injury at hand. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 307 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Following that, if the student failed to utilize these remedial and preventative
measures, she would not qualify for Title IX relief. Id. See infra Part III.C (discussing
various protocol and the shortcomings of relying on reactive procedures).
104
See supra Part II.B (discussing Canton, Franklin, Gebser, and Davis); supra note 17
(discussing Bayh’s vision).
105
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 304. Several alternative remedies are available outside of Title IX,
but these approaches have led to varied results. See generally Knackert v. Estes, 926 F.
Supp. 979 (D. Nev. 1996) (applying Nevada law) (a Nevada District Court held that the
school district was liable for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student under the doctrine
of respondeat superior); Ada D. v. City of New York, 190 A.D.2d 356 (1st Dep't 1993), order
aff'd, 638 N.E.2d 962, (1994) (a school may be negligent in hiring or supervising an
employee with a propensity to engage in sexual misconduct); P.L. v. Aubert, 545 N.W.2d
666 (Minn. 1996) (the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered dismissal of a student’s negligent
supervision action against a school, for injuries sustained during a sexual relationship with
a teacher because the court determined that the district’s supervision of the teacher had
been adequate, and that closer attention would not have prevented or revealed the
relationship); Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1999) (the Iowa Supreme Court
affirmed a directed verdict for the school district in an action brought by a student to
103
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insufficient procedural safeguards and excessive power imbalances to
effectively prevent instances of sexual harassment in college athletics
from being investigated and prosecuted, especially when committed in a
team setting.106
As athletics become more competitive at all levels, coaches gain
power and prestige that could be used to harm players.107 In addition to
the difficulty in creating adequate procedural safeguards to address
sexual harassment, the power structure of a team creates an environment
conducive to harassment, consequently forming additional obstacles to
utilizing procedural measures.108
Schools and athletic programs have attempted to address sexual
harassment by enacting various procedural measures, although the
success of the measures is questionable.109 These procedures tend to be
reactive, utilized only after harassment has occurred and the damage has
been done to the athlete.110 Institutions need to take interest in
recover damages for years of sexual harassment by school curriculum director under
vicarious liability standard because the director’s sexual abuse was not of the same basic
nature as his duties as curriculum director); States Get Tough on Classroom Sexual
Misconduct, CNN, Jan. 28, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/01/27/teacher.sex.
abuse.ap/index.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008) (new Missouri legislation would eliminate
statute of limitations for sexual misconduct).
106
See supra Part II.C.3 (noting that Jennings is a well known case in which both the trial
and appellate courts found that the coach’s actions did not rise to the level of sexual
harassment and that it was only after the appellate court re-heard the case en banc that the
judges found in favor of Jennings).
107
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the Jennings case). See also Jennings, 444 F.3d at 283.
Coach Dorrance was the most successful women’s soccer coach in history, having won 18
of the 23 championships held before 2004. Id. He also coached the women’s U.S. National
Team, and many girls stated they would “cut off their right arm” to play for him. Jennings,
482 F3d. at 696.
108
See supra Part II.C.3 (using Jennings as an example of an instance when a coach used
his position and power to create an environment in which he could manipulate and harass
female players).
109
See infra Part III.C.A. See Robin Finn, Out of Bounds – A Special Report: Growth in
Women’s Sports Stirs Harassment Issue, N.Y. TIMES 11, March 7, 1999. The New York Times
report discussed the circumstances surrounding an increase in harassment:
[T]he rise in reports of harassment by male coaches is acknowledged to
be an unanticipated byproduct of a landmark victory for women: Title
IX, the 1972 law barring sexual discrimination at schools that receive
Federal money. As participation in organized women's athletics has
rocketed from 300,000 to 3 million student-athletes in the wake of Title
IX, creating a need for thousands of new coaches, the share of those
coaches who are women has dropped dramatically: at the college
level, the percentage of female head coaches of women's teams has
fallen to 47.4 percent, from 90 percent in 1972.
Id.
110
See supra note 103 (discussing the OCR’s Guidance, which suggests specific grievance
procedures but only briefly reviews proactive preventative measures).
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preventing harm to their students by instituting measures to prevent
sexual harassment that go beyond merely avoiding legal liability.111
Part III.A analyzes how the Gebser standard has been exploited so as
to allow weak policies to interact with the existing power imbalances,
leading to an environment especially vulnerable to sexual harassment.112
Part III.B considers what impact the inherent power imbalance plays in
creating an environment vulnerable to harassment, as well as impeding
the prevention and reporting of sexual harassment in these
environments.113 Finally, Part III.C uses the interplay between the
twisted standard and inherent power imbalances to show why
institutions tend to concentrate on reactive measures at the expense of
preventative procedures, and focuses on the shortcomings typically
present in these reactive policies that betray the intent of Title IX.114
A. The Gebser Standard Leads to Poorly Formulated Policy and Exacerbates
Existing Power Imbalances
Under the Gebser standard, only when a federal funding recipient
has actual notice of, and was deliberately indifferent to, sexual
harassment can the recipient be held liable for monetary damages.115
The Supreme Court’s decisions have made it difficult for college athletes
to succeed because the actual notice and deliberate indifference prongs
provide an institution with loopholes that allow it to avoid liability.116
See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677. The passive language of the statute demonstrates the
focus on the well-being of the benefited class. Id. (“No person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1681).
112
Infra Part III.A (discussing the language of the Gebser standard and the way it can, and
has, been twisted to reduce schools’ liability under Title IX, concentrating on who the
“appropriate person” is to receive notice and the ways a school can avoid liability if its
actions merely surpass an attitude of “deliberate indifference” to sexual harassment); see
also States Get Tough on Classroom Sexual Misconduct, CNN, Jan. 28, 2008,
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/01/27/teacher.sex.abuse.ap/index.html (last visited Jan
28, 2008) (“When abuse happens, administrators too often fail to let others know about it,
and too many legal loopholes let offenders stay in the classroom.”).
113
Infra Part III.B (examining the power hierarchy inherent in college athletics, and the
manner in which it restricts an athlete’s opportunities to report sexual harassment while, at
the same time, increasing the risk that a sexually hostile environment will develop).
114
Infra Part III.C (exploring the suggested OCR policies and the reactive policies
generally enacted by schools and athletic programs that, when combined with power
imbalances inherent in college athletics, results in reduced school responsibility and
difficulty in preventing sexual harassment).
115
See supra Part II.C. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651. The harassment must also be so severe
and pervasive that it creates a hostile environment. Id. The power imbalance discussed
earlier is one component of creating a hostile environment and is one of the “constellation”
of factors considered by the courts. Id. See also Part III.B (analyzing the power imbalance).
116
See supra Parts II.B.3-C.2 (offering an examination and criticism of the idea of actual
notice).
111
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Ideally, an institution has received notice when it “knew or, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have known” about the ongoing
harassment.117 Difficulty in determining liability results because it is
often unclear who the appropriate official to receive notice is, and it is
also unclear what the notice must consist of in the athletic
environment.118 There is no set standard specifically for athletics,119 but
analogies can be drawn between examples given by the OCR Guidance
for schools and the corresponding situations in athletics.120

117
See Revised Guidance supra, note 20, at V.B1; see also Notice of Publication of
Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11450 (discussing different ways a school can receive notice). See
infra note 120. This is an optimistic view of notice, as the Department of Education is a
government body committed to pursuing and treating sexual harassment aggressively. See
infra note 120.
118
Kristen M. Galles, Filling the Gaps: Women, Civil Rights and Title IX, AM. BAR ASS’N
SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS (Summer 2004),
http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer04/gaps.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
Ironically, the court in Gebser actually refused to adopt a more lenient standard such as the
one used in employee-employer harassment cases in Title VII, where the employer can be
held liable if it should have known of the harassment. Id.
119
Viv Bernstein, Sex Harassment Faces Title IX Test, WOMEN’S ENEWS, Sept. 23, 2007.
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm?aid=3323 (last visited Jan. 28, 2008). See cf.
Jennings, 482 F.3d at 725 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the dissent here seems to
suggest that the environment of college athletics is naturally more demanding and more
hostile, and therefore the same standard should not be applied to athletics as is applied in
the classroom or courtroom. Id. at 725. The dissent concluded that
In the context of this case, Title IX presents the narrow issue of
whether a player—in this case Jennings—was denied the benefits of
the soccer team because of Coach Dorrance's comments. It is crystal
clear that she did not think so until after she was cut from the team.
From her anger and disappointment in being cut—concededly not
because of sexual discrimination—she pursues this unfortunate
lawsuit to complain about vulgar language that surely did offend her,
and rightfully so. But Title IX requires more.
Id.
120
See Revised Guidance supra note 20, at V.C:
A student, parent, or other individual may have contacted other
appropriate personnel, such as a principal, campus security, bus
driver, teacher, affirmative action officer, or staff in the office of
student affairs. A teacher or other responsible employee of the school
may have witnessed the harassment. The school may receive notice
about harassment in an indirect manner, from sources such as a
member of the school staff, a member of the educational or local
community, or the media.
Id. Dear Colleague letter from Kenneth L. Marcus, Office for Civil Rights, TITLE IX
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, (Apr. 26, 2004),
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/responsibilities_ix.html. This is a bit of an
optimistic list because it comes from the Department of Education, who is “committed to
enforcing Title IX aggressively.” Id.
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In the groundbreaking Gebser case, the school principal knew of the
ongoing sexual harassment, but was not considered the appropriate
school official to trigger school liability.121 He or she apparently did not
have the authority to institute “corrective measures” on the district’s
behalf.122 This is comparable to claiming that the athletic director of a
school did not have the authority to institute changes in the athletic
department.123 While the “notice” standard in athletics has not been
considered by the Supreme Court, there is a slight trend, at least at the
appellate level, to find that if the abuse was reported to a member of the
school staff, an appropriate person did have notice.124 However, many
lower courts have still been reluctant to hold institutions liable, refusing
to be what some call “polite police” for coaches, or fearing that Title IX is
becoming a “general civility code.”125
Sexual harassment in the classroom has been litigated much more
than harassment on the playing field, so it is beneficial to examine who
was considered the appropriate official by the courts in those cases.126
Lower courts have held that giving notice to a guidance counselor,127 a
school principal,128 or a director of a university department129 does not
always trigger institutional liability because these are not the appropriate
See supra Part II.C (articulating the “actual notice” test).
See supra Part II.B. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. “[A] damages remedy will not lie under
Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged
discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the [funding] recipient's behalf has
actual knowledge of discrimination” and is deliberately indifferent to it. Id. See also
Jennings, 444 F.3d 255. In Jennings, both the trial and appellate courts found that, although
the student athlete reported her harassment to the university’s counsel and an official
responsible for fielding sexual harassment claims, the school did not have notice. Id. It was
only after a rehearing en banc that the court held that this did, in fact, constitute notice. Id.
The en banc hearing resulted in three circuit court judges finding for the athlete and two
judges dissenting in favor of the defendant. Id.
123
See also infra Part III.B. At larger universities, one must wonder what the chances are
for a freshman on the volleyball team, or a red-shirted member of the wrestling team, to
meet privately with the athletic director to report sexual harassment. See infra Part III.B
(further exploring the difficulty in reporting that exists because of power imbalances
issues).
124
See, e.g., Jennings, 482 F.3d 686 (abuse reported to a member of the administration).
But see Simpson, 500 F.3d 1170 (overall environment does not constitute notice).
125
Bernstein, supra note 119 (quoting Nancy Hogshead-Makar, professor at Florida
Coastal Law School and a Title IX expert). See also Jennings, 482 F.3d at 716; supra Part II.C.3
(examining the level of abuse necessary to rise to the level required for a claim under Title
IX).
126
See supra Part II (discussing several ground-breaking Title IX cases).
127
Good v. Reading Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2002).
128
Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001).
129
Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999). See also Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786
(11th Cir. 1998) (it was not sufficient that the supervisor of a school security guard knew of
the assault).
121
122
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officials.130 Specifically, the language of Gebser requires that an official
with power to “institute corrective measures” must have notice.131 This
requirement allows institutions to jump through a loophole because the
official with this power is most likely so high up the hierarchy that
athletes have no real access to him.132 The class of persons that actually
has the authority to “institute corrective measures” is likely a very small
group; only few people can institute measures against a popular,
successful coach.133 A further problem is that if student-athletes do have
access to this official, the athlete may not feel comfortable going to the
individual because there is no pre-existing relationship with that person
or the official is a friend of the harassing coach.134 Therefore, the
requirement of notice to a particular person hinders reporting, and has
remained a loophole available for institutions to avoid liability.135
An additional element in the Gebser standard is that after the
appropriate official receives actual notice, the institution must be
“deliberately indifferent” to the sexual harassment.136
Deliberate
indifference “is an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the

130
See also Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 398–400 (5th Cir. 1996).
Canutillo held, contrary to the Department of Education’s policy, that a school district was
not liable when a teacher sexually molested a second grade student because the student
and her mother reported the harassment only to the student’s homeroom teacher. Id. Even
though the school handbook instructed students and parents to report sexual harassment
grievances to a child’s homeroom teacher, the court held that notice must be given to
“someone with authority to take remedial action[.]” Id. at 402. But see Morse v. Regents of
the Univ. of Colorado, 154 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 1998) (the Tenth Circuit Court found that the
institution could be sued because the university affirmative action officer and a dean had
notice of the harassment).
131
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
132
Id. at 284. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of how the power structure prevents
athletes from feeling comfortable reporting their coaches or other officials.
133
See Jennings, 444 F.3d at 283. Coach Dorrance was the most successful women’s soccer
coach in history. Id. See also Part IV.B (emphasizing the need to have appropriate officials
available outside the athletic office as well).
134
See supra Part IV.B (proposing new regulations that would provide athletes with more
outlets to report sexual harassment and would encourage a community standard).
135
See infra Part IV.B (suggesting a legal standard more in line with the Department of
Education’s standard for agency enforcement).
136
See supra Part II. The deliberate indifference standard becomes chillingly high when
coupled with the requirement that the harassment must rise to a level that limits or denies
“a student's ability to participate in or benefit from a school program[.]” Revised Guidance
supra note 20, at V.B.1. The opportunity to be a part of an athletic team is clearly an
educational benefit that would be denied if a student-athlete lost a scholarship, had their
playing time reduced, or was cut from the team because of reporting a coach or other
school official for sexual harassment. Clare Williams, Sexual Orientation Harassment and
Discrimination: Legal Protection for Student Athletes, 17 J. OF LEG. ASPECTS OF SPORT 253, 275
(Summer 2007).
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violation[]” or a refusal to take action to comply with Title IX.137 At a
minimum, if an institution takes “timely and reasonable measures to end
the harassment, it is not liable under Title IX.”138 For a school to reach
the level of deliberate indifference that will result in liability, it must
either completely ignore the harassment or take actions that could not be
expected to remedy the violation.139
This standard leads to problems because it allows—even
encourages—simply addressing the harassment after it has already
occurred; there is no real requirement for the institution to prevent
harassment.140 Some federal judges have even suggested that because
sports are naturally competitive, the standard should be higher.141 If a
college athletic department fails to prevent the sexual harassment of a
student, the school is not liable under Title IX unless it had a systematic
institutional policy of being indifferent.142 On the other hand, if, after the
proper person receives actual notice, the athletic department or the
school as a whole refuses to address the known sexual harassment
violations, the school can be held liable under Title IX.143 Therefore,
institutions avoid legal liability by implementing sufficient measures so
that they cannot be seen as being “deliberately indifferent” to the

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. See supra, Part II.C.1 (explaining that deliberate indifference
occurs when the institution takes steps that are “clearly unreasonable[]”).
138
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91. See also Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d
1022, 1034 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a school district must be deliberately indifferent
to its students’ right to an education free of hostility and discrimination).
139
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91.
140
See infra Part III.C. See also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288. The court provided a legal standard
for recovery of damages, but did not even address equitable relief such as an injunction
against schools who refuse or are negligent in adopting preventative measures. Id. See
Wiener, supra note 46:
The theories of liability that the Supreme Court applies in Titles
VII and IX appear indifferent to the common experience of workers
and students. That is, the courts assume a great deal about the effects
of different reporting standards without knowledge of the impact of
those standards on the behavior of workers, teachers and students.
Psychologists can assist the courts in clarifying the distinction
between Title VII and IX liability by investigating the impact of victim
reporting requirements on the perceptions of safety, control and
comfort in students and workers.
Id.
141
See Jennings, 482 F.3d at 719. Judge Niemeyer took issue with the majority’s position
in his dissent to Jennings, calling the test it used a watered down “negative impact” test. Id.
142
AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 339 (2007).
143
Id. See infra Part III.C (discussing OCR-recommended and already existing policies).
137
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harassment, which becomes problematic when sexual harassment
continues to occur in the powerful hierarchy of college athletics.144
B. The Power Imbalances Inherent in Athletics
The above-mentioned harassment nearly always takes place in either
a school or an athletic setting where power imbalances are rampant.145
Federal funding recipients retain control over the environment in which
the harassment occurs, and more importantly, in many settings, the
school board will exercise significant control over the actual harasser.146
Sexual harassment tends to be more rampant “in institutions
characterized by hierarchical distributions of power”—structures that
are common in intercollegiate sports environments.147
There are a multitude of definitions of sexual harassment and many
of them include an element of power imbalance.148 Coaches and teachers
144
See infra Part III.B. The resulting problem of institutions relying on reactive measures,
rather than focusing on preventing the harm from ever being inflicted, will be addressed in
depth in Part III.C. See generally infra Part III.C.
145
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995). It is relevant to examine
power structure because the Supreme Court has observed “that the nature of [the State's]
power [over public schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.” Id. See also Davis, 526
U.S. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Independent Women's Forum as
Amicus Curiae 19) (“questioning whether ‘at the primary and secondary school level’ it is
proper to label ’sexual misconduct by students’ as ‘sexual harassment’ because there is no
power relationship between the harasser and the victim”). See also Finn, supra note 109, at
11. Researchers commented that “[t]here's no such thing as consensual anything when one
person has that much control over another.” Id.
146
Davis, 526 U.S. at 646. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 507 (1969) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of school
officials’ “comprehensive authority” consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards
to prescribe and control conduct in the schools).
147
Karin A.E. Volkwein, Frauke I. Schnell, Dennis Sherwood & Anne Livezey, Sexual
Harassment in Sport: Perceptions and Experiences of American Female Student-Athletes, 32 INT’L
REV. FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 283 (1997). See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). The Court explained,
A professional football player's working environment is not severely
or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the
buttocks as he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would
reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or
female) back at the office.
Id.
148
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2007). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
defines sexual harassment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
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operating within an institution are automatically placed in positions with
more power than students.149 The status of the persons involved is
important.150 One university’s policy explicitly states that “[s]exual
harassment has more to do with power than with sex.”151 Although
students and faculty may conduct themselves in the same harassing
manner, faculty members are less likely than students to be aware of the
effects of their power and the fact that their positions of power make
them more likely to be perceived as harassers.152
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id. See Fla. St. Univ. Student Conduct Code, available at http://askew.fsu.edu/current/
doctoral/studentpolicies.html.
Florida State University’s doctoral program states:
The key elements of sexual harassment are that (a) there is a power
imbalance between the faculty member and the student, with the
faculty member taking advantage of this institutional authority and (b)
there is emphasis in one way or another on the sexual identify [sic] of
the harassed. What is violated is not only a relationship of authority
but also one of trust.
Id. See also MASS. COMMISS’N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, MODEL SEXUAL HARASSMENT
POLICY, http://www.mass.gov/mcad/harassment.html.
The legal definition in Massachusetts for sexual harassment is as follows:
“[S]sexual harassment” means sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:
(a) submission to or rejection of such advances, requests or conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment
or as a basis for employment decisions; or,
(b) such advances, requests or conduct have the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance by
creating an intimidating, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive
work environment.
Id.
See
also
Univ.
of
Neb.,
Affirmative
Action/Equal
Opportunity,
http://www.unk.edu/offices/aaeo/index.php?id=1524. University of Nebraska, Kearny
adds: “Sexual harassment differs from ordinary flirting because it occurs in the context of a
power imbalance allowing one person to intimidate another person.” Id.
149
U.C.L.A.
Student
Psychological
Services,
Sexual
Harassment
Brochure,
http://www.sps.ucla.edu/brochures_sexaulharssment.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008). See
also Sophia Jowett & David Lavallee, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN SPORT 4 (Human Kinetics,
2007). The authors, Jowett and Lavallee, stress that “[t]he coach-athlete relationship is
characterized by high levels of interdependence that can have positive or negative
ramifications depending on how interdependence is experienced.” Id. at 4.
150
Ellen Sekreta, Sexual Harassment, Misconduct, and the Atmosphere of the Laboratory: The
Legal and Professional Challenges Faced by Women Physical Science Researchers at Educational
Institutions, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 115, 120 (Spring 2006). The status of the harasser
can even affect what he perceives to be harassing behavior. Id.
151
Univ. of Neb., Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity, http://www.unk.edu/offices/
aaeo/index.php?id=1524.
152
Sekreta, supra note 150, at 121.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/12

Schroeder: Power Imbalances in College Athletics and an Exploited Standard:

2009]
1.

Title IX and College Athletics

1515

Coaches’ Control over Players

Sexual harassment tends to be more rampant in hierarchical
institutions with an unequal distribution of power among the parties;
this is the typical structure of a college athletic team.153 The opportunity
to harass is created by differences in power and position, leading the
more powerful individual to extort various types of sexual
gratification.154 An age disparity between the alleged harasser and the
victim is also relevant in establishing whether a power imbalance exists
that may add to a sexually hostile environment.155 For example, the
majority of college coaches are men, and these men hold significant
power over female athletes regarding scholarships, playing time, and
team membership.156 The special relationship between coach and athlete
See generally Volkwein et al., supra note 147. This type of sexual harassment is also
present in the classroom, where teachers have the power and control over the student’s
grades. See Guidance (1997), supra note 95, at Introduction (introducing the different types
of harassment that may present in the classroom). If a teacher or other employee uses the
authority he was given to force a student into a sexual situation, the employee “‘stands in
the shoes’” of the school and the school should be liable for the use of its authority by the
teacher or coach. Id. at Liability of a School for Sexual Harassment.
154
See Sekreta supra note 150, at 121. A U.S. Department of Education pamphlet
published in September 2008 notes that “[i]t is difficult to say ‘no’ to a . . . coach.. . . A
person who complains about sexual harassment is often rejected . . . and labeled a
troublemaker.” DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CODE 16: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT ACADEMIC 1997, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/ocrshpam.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
155
Davis, 526 U.S at 651. See also Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697. Coach Dorrance also was
much older than his players and wanted them to view him as a “father figure,” which
would enhance their trust in him, and, in the end, further exacerbated the power
imbalance. Id. At first, the district court did not appreciate the importance of this power
imbalance and granted the school summary judgment. Jennings, 444 F.3d at 255. The
plaintiff in Jennings also felt increased pressure because of the age difference between her
and her coach. Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697. She recounted a story: “I was 17 when he asked
me [‘Who are you fucking?’] in a dark hotel room, knee-to-knee, bed not made, sitting at
one of those tiny tables.” Id. See also Rhonda Reaves, “There's No Crying in Baseball”: Sports
and the Legal and Social Construction of Gender, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 283, 297–98 (2001)
(commenting that usually when a plaintiff brings a Title IX hostile environment claim
against a coach, the harasser is older than the victim and the age gap exacerbates a coach’s
already powerful position over his younger athletes).
156
Volkwein, et al., supra note 147, at 285–86. The Women’s Sports Foundation’s position
is that “[c]oaches exercise power over athletes, whether in giving them praise or criticism,
evaluating them, making recommendations that further their athletic goals or conferring
any other benefits on them.” Melanie Bennett, et al., Sexual Harassment—Sexual Harassment
and Sexual Relationships between Coaches, Other Athletic Personnel and Athletes: The Foundation
Position, Issues and Actions, Oct. 1, 2007, http://www.womenssportsfoundationote
org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/coach/article.html?record=575. See also Henderson, 469 F.3d at
484. Here, a high school coach made it known to his female players that complaints about
coaching would result in a loss of playing time. Id. His coaching style also included
obscenities, as he addressed his players in “demeaning and vulgar terms.” Id. After
153
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is “‘all about emotions, about trust and about the body.’”157
Coaches have significant control over the intimate details of an athlete’s
life, such as their overall health, relationships, and sexual behavior; this
demonstrates that coaches have even more control over an athlete than a
professor would have over a student.158 The Jennings court pointed out
that “[a] typical college coach is going to have much more informal,
casual, one-on-one contact with a student-athlete than a typical
university instructor will have with a student.”159 Coaches also exert
power through praise and criticism of the athlete and by imposing
restrictions on the athlete’s personal life.160 These factors combine and
make athletes particularly susceptible to a coach’s abuse of power and
control.161
In Jennings, the coach in question was the most successful women’s
soccer coach in history and had tremendous power over the players.162

pursuing a relationship with one of his high school players, the coach “threatened the
entire team with ‘consequences’ if anyone disclosed his relationship with [her].” Id.
Another player testified she knew that the player being pursued by the coach was
uncomfortable with his advances. Id. In addition, the player testified that behavior
exhibited by the coach, including fondling, kissing, and hugging, was unwelcome and
offensive to the targeted player. Id. The threatened loss of playing time not only impeded
reporting but also magnified the already-present power imbalance. See also infra Part III.C
(discussing the result when power imbalances and a weak standard combine in the college
athletic environment).
157
Finn, supra note 109, at 11 (quoting Don Sabo, a sociology professor at D'Youville
College in Buffalo, who has developed harassment workshops for coaches).
158
Volkwein, et al., supra note 147, at 285. See also Finn supra note 109, at 11. A person
Finn interviewed commented, “When you put a male in a position of power where he can
manipulate something of real meaning to an athlete, such as playing time or a scholarship,
then add in the possibility of a young girl who may have a crush, you’ve got an extremely
dangerous mix.” Id.
159
Jennings, 444 F.3d at 274. See also R.V. Acosta & L.J. Carpenter, Women in Intercollegiate
Sport: A Longitudinal Study—Twenty-Nine Year Update, 1977-2006, in EQUAL PLAY: TITLE IX
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 169 (Andrew Zimbalist & Nancy Hogshead-Makar, eds., 2007).
Statistics show the grim reality of Title IX: in 2006 only 42.4% of women’s teams (and less
than 2% of men’s teams) were led by a female head coach—the lowest level of
representation ever, down from more than 90% when Title IX was enacted. Id.
160
Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics’ Unique
Environments for Sexual Harassment Claims: Balancing the Realities of Athletics with Preventing
Potential Claims, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 173, 174 (2003).
161
Deanna DeFrancesco, Jennings v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Title IX,
Intercollegiate Athletics and Sexual Harassment, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 1271, 1293–94 (2007).
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979). For example, according to noted scholar Catherine MacKinnon,
sexual harassment is the “unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power.” Id.
162
Jennings, 482 F.3d at 696. See Jennings, 444 F.3d at 274. The district court in
Jennings also elaborated on the unusual role of a coach:
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The disparity in power between the coach and his players “trapped
players into responding to his questions and enduring the
environment.”163
The coach controlled everything, from team
membership to scholarship eligibility.164 Any type of power imbalance
must be examined in an allegation of sexual harassment because “[i]f the
court does not perceive a power imbalance, it may weigh strongly
against a finding of harassment.”165 These types of power imbalances are
not restricted to coaches—any member of the athletic personnel staff
may have some type of power over the athlete.
2.

Other Positions of Power over Players

Not only do coaches exercise a substantial amount of control over
their players, but athletic trainers, the athletic director, and other
administrative officials also have power over the student-athletes.166
Athletic directors, along with the coach, control the scholarship dollars,
practice times, game publicity, equipment purchases, and many other
day-to-day details in the athlete’s life.167 The athletic trainers are

College sports often involve long daily practice sessions, overnight
travel, . . . and the need for a coach to discuss issues associated with
academic performance, athletics performance, and health . . . .
Additionally, . . . a college coach is much more likely to demonstrate
an athletic move with a hands-on demonstration. . . . Likewise, some
coaches will use profanity, slang, sarcasm, or hamhanded humor. . .to
make a point, or to motivate.
Id.
Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697. See Crandell v. N.Y. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 87 F.Supp.2d
304, 319 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) (denying summary judgment because the unequal power
relationship between harasser and victim could feasibly support a jury finding of the
establishment of a sexually hostile environment).
164
Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697. Interestingly, even before matriculation, the plaintiff was a
walk-on and was never recommended for a scholarship. Id. at 709.
165
DeFrancesco, supra note 161, at 1295.
166
See supra Part III.B (discussing power imbalances). Hogshead-Makar, supra note 160,
at 184.
The identity of and relationship between the alleged harasser and the
subject or subjects of the harassment [will be considered by the OCR in
investigating allegations of sexual harassment] . . . For example, due to
the power a professor or teacher [or coach] has over a student, sexually
based conduct by that person toward a student is more likely to create
a hostile environment than similar conduct by another student.
Id.
167
See supra Part II.A. Revised Guideline, supra note 20, at V.A.1. The OCR Revised
Guidance specifically gives the existence of a power imbalance (the “identity of and
relationship between the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of the harassment[]”)
as a factor to be considered, especially in cases involving allegations of sexual harassment
of a student by a school employee. Id.
163
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responsible for the athlete’s health and wellness; this includes clearing
the player to play after an injury.168 The power to tell an athlete when he
or she can play again with the team is indeed a great power.169 Other
administrative officials within the athletic office at a university may also
exhibit great power over the athletes regarding ticketing for games, class
schedules, and perhaps most importantly, act as a direct pipeline to the
coach himself.170 Student-athletes clearly are at the bottom of the power
structure.
This power imbalance therefore creates a hierarchical structure
fraught with opportunities for harassment.171
In addition, the
“appropriate official” who needs to receive notice of harassment
typically is a powerful official with whom the athlete may not be
familiar, such as an administrator who is not in the gym or on the
playing field everyday.172 Most likely, the power imbalance between the
student victim and the official is great, which makes it unlikely that an
athlete would report the incident.173 It is unrealistic to expect the athlete

This is an immense power over an athlete, as clearing a player to play is usually a
judgment call, perhaps made based on some physical tests, but in the end the power to
play lies with the trainer. The level of competitiveness within the team for playing time is
also quite high: an extended period of sitting out for an injury could have a serious
detrimental effect on the athlete’s career. See Barbara Osborne, Principles of Liability for
Athletic Trainers: Managing Sport-Related Concussion, 36 J. ATHL. TRAIN. 316 (July–Sept.
2001); Gerald Eskenazi, ATHLETE AND HEALTH: MANY AT RISK, New York Times, March 11,
1990 at sec. 8, p. 1 (discussing the pressure to clear athletes as soon as possible). See also
Benito J. Velasquez, Sexual Harassment: A Concern for the Athletic Trainer, 33 J. Athl. Train.
171, 172, 174 (June 1998). Id. Sexual harassment is of grave concern for athletic trainers in
such a pressure-filled position. Id.
169
See supra note 166. Many schools have both professional and student athletic trainers
on staff. See supra note 166 (discussing power imbalance, which can also exist between
students, as a factor to be considered in sexual harassment cases).
170
See generally supra note 156. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (“The relationship between the
harasser and the victim necessarily affects the extent to which the misconduct can be said
to breach Title IX's guarantee of equal access to educational benefits[.]”); Patricia H. v.
Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist, 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 (1993) (commenting that the “‘grave
disparity in age and power’ between harasser and victim contributed to the creation of a
hostile environment”); Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 95 at n.57 (“‘impact of
the . . . remarks was heightened by the fact that the coach is an adult in a position of
authority’”). See also note 150 (faculty may not realize their behavior is harassing).
171
See Jowett & Lavallee, supra note 149, at 42. “[C]oaches and parents often have power
over the athlete to dictate behavior and access to valued resources.” Id.
172
See supra text accompanying note 71 (showing that, at a minimum, the official must
have the power to enact corrective measures).
173
See supra Part II.C (explaining the notice standard and that one of the clearest ways of
receiving notice is through a report). See also Press Release, Committee on Education and
Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, While Progress Has Been Made, More Must Be Done to
Strengthen and Enforce Title IX (June 19, 2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/
list/speech/edlabor_dem/RelJune19.html. “[I]n many cases, female students . . . do not
168
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to report her coach—who holds the power of her scholarship, her
playing time, and her social life—to an “appropriate official” who has a
close working relationship with the coach.174 Because of the typical
tightly-knit atmosphere in the field of athletics, it is likely that the coach,
the athletic director, and others in the office are friendly with each other,
making the prospect of reporting a coach or other staff member for
sexual harassment especially difficult.175 The power structure inherent
on a team can impede the successful use of procedural safeguards
implemented to address sexual harassment.176
As discussed above, Jennings provides an example of how the
extreme power imbalance that exists between a coach and a player may
enable sexual harassment.177 In Jennings, the athlete was worried she
would lose her playing time or place on the team if she refused her
coach’s demands to discuss sexual issues.178 Just as importantly, the
power imbalance impeded her intentions of reporting the harassment.179
The player was not comfortable confronting her coach, and the power

report Title IX complaints to their schools because they are either unaware of the law’s
protections or they fear retaliation.” Id.
174
It is difficult, then, to determine who the courts would find to be an “appropriate
official” in harassment cases in athletics. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277. According to Gebser, it
must be an official “who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on
the district's behalf[.]” Id.
175
See supra Part II. According to the Women’s Sports Foundation, sexual relationships
between coaches and athletes are inappropriate because the coach has professional
responsibility for the athlete. It also makes the atmosphere uncomfortable for others within
the program and tends to increase the chances for a coach to abuse his power. See, e.g.,
Bennett, supra note 156 (discussing the power coaches have over their players).
176
See supra Part III.B (discussing the power imbalance and other problems inherent in
the existing reporting structures).
177
See supra Part III.B (discussing the power imbalance between Coach Dorrance and a
college soccer player).
178
Jennings, 444 F.3d. at 293. See also Turner v. McQuarter, 79 F.Supp.2d 911 (N.D. Ill.
1999). A player at Chicago State University engaged in a sexual relationship with her
coach, which she alleged she would not have done except she was afraid that her refusal to
do so would have adverse consequences for her regarding her playing time, difficult
practice conditions, and even her “‘ability to graduate[.]’” Id. at 913–14.
179
Jennings, 444 F.3d at 293. Jennings went to the university’s legal counsel and reported
the harassment and her feelings of discomfort, but the counsel brushed it off by telling
Jennings that her coach was a “‘great guy’” and to “‘work it out’” with the coach. Id. The
university counsel then “‘shov[ed] [Jennings] out the door.’” Id. This is an example of the
university community being very tight knit, making it difficult and perhaps pointless for
an athlete to report sexual harassment to a friend of the person who harassed her. Jennings,
482 F.3d at 693. Sending Jennings back to her coach to deal with this issue was clearly an
unreasonable method of dealing with her harassment because her coach exerted a great
deal of power over her life and because his actions were the very problem she was
reporting. See id.; see also infra Part IV (proposing alternatives reporting mechanisms that
could avoid that problem).
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structure impeded any attempt at reporting the harassment.180 In this
case, the power structure precluded Jennings from having a person to
whom she could realistically report the harassment and be taken
seriously. Similarly, the power imbalance inherent in college athletics
creates an atmosphere specifically conducive to sexual harassment, and
then impedes reporting because the coach or other official is either the
very person to whom the athlete is expected to report or has a close
working relationship with that person.181 This example demonstrates
how the requirement of actual notice in the hierarchical environment of
college athletics allows sexual harassment to continue, unfettered.182
C. Betraying Title IX: The Weakened Gebser Standard and Existing Power
Imbalances Allow Institutions to Form Procedures Which Merely React to
Sexual Harassment
Unfortunately, “[d]espite the public attention that sexual harassment
in athletics has received lately, few institutions have thoroughly
addressed whether general institutional sexual harassment policies are
effective and suitable in the context of intercollegiate athletics.”183 While
much attention has been given to the tests for determining compliance in
funding and providing equal athletic opportunities, a great weakness in
the Title IX regulatory scheme is that procedures and tests for
compliance with sexual harassment regulations have not received similar
attention.184 This is especially apparent in the world of collegiate
athletics—a complicated environment where an unbalanced power

180
Jennings commented that she did not feel comfortable talking to her coach about his
behavior, and clearly talking with the school’s legal counsel did not help either, as the
counsel was not willing to take the complaint seriously because she thought the coach was
a “‘great guy.’” Jennings, 444 F.3d at 293–94. See also infra Part IV (suggesting amendments
to the OCR regulations that would address the issues created by power imbalances).
181
To compound this matter, these are usually also the same officials that must have
notice in order for the school to be liable. See supra Part III.B.
182
See infra Part III.C (exploring the depth of the dangerous relationship between the
Gebser standard and power imbalances in college athletics).
183
Hogshead-Makar, supra note 160, at 174.
184
See infra note 212 (articulating the three prong test used to determine equality in
athletic funding). See also 20 U.S.C. §§ 3413, 3441 (2000). The OCR is responsible for
enforcement of Title IX. Id. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text for an example
of regulations passed to enforce Title IX. The OCR has also issued a series of letters,
guidances, and regulations to assist in enforcing Title IX. See, e.g., Revised Guidance, supra
note 20; Dear Colleague letter April 26, supra note 120; USDOJ Coordination & Review,
supra note 31; SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT ACADEMIC, supra note 154. See infra Part III.C
(analyzing certain OCR recommendations).
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structure leaves the athlete especially vulnerable to sexual harassment,
yet without adequate avenues to pursue procedural safeguards.185
Prevention was an important goal of Title IX, as demonstrated by the
focus in the text of the statute on the benefited class rather than on the
perpetrator.186 However, the jurisprudence interpreting Gebser has
exploited the standard so as to provide many loopholes for institutions
to avoid legal liability.187 The answers to questions regarding who the
appropriate school official is and what constitutes actual notice remain
unclear.188 A school, to avoid legal liability, needs to take only those
reactive measures that do not exhibit deliberate indifference to sexual
harassment. In fact, many schools do just that.189 Technically, a school
can allow its vulnerable athletes to be injured, so long as appropriate
measures are taken later to protect the school from legal liability.190 Even
though the OCR has implemented several regulations indicating the
need for greater protection for athletes, schools have not been held to
these requirements.191 In the end, athletes are still vulnerable to
powerful coaches and other officials.192 Taken together, the power
imbalance and the poorly-constructed standard result in institutions
185
See supra Part III.B (discussing the power imbalances existent in postsecondary
athletics).
186
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677.
187
See supra Part III.A (analyzing the watered down interpretation of the standard).
188
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing actual notice).
189
Supra at Part II.C. In Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2007), the
school talked to the boy involved and separated the victim’s desk from the harasser, but
the harassment continued for some time. The court found that “a claim that the school
system could or should have done more is insufficient to establish deliberate
indifference[.]” Id. The court emphasized that the actions the school takes need to be
clearly unreasonable. Id. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648). In conclusion, the circuit court
found that “[t]he test for whether a school should be liable under Title IX for student-onstudent harassment is not one of effectiveness by hindsight.” Id. at 74.
190
See supra Part III.A (discussing the legal requirements to avoid liability).
191
See Frequently Asked Questions about Sexual Harassment, Department of Education,
Office for Civil Rights, last modified Jan 26, 2006, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/qa-sexharass.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
OCR investigates and resolves
complaints alleging that educational institutions that are recipients of federal funds have
failed to protect students from harassment based on sex. Id. “Complaints are often
resolved by agreements requiring schools to adopt effective anti-harassment policies and
procedures, train staff and students, address the incidents in question, and . . . take other
steps to restore a nondiscriminatory environment.” Id. See Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 398–400;
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Ind. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997). In at least two decisions,
Canutillo and Rosa H., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Title IX law in a manner
inconsistent with OCR’s longstanding policy and practice. See Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 398–
400; Rosa H., 106 F.3d 648.
192
See supra Parts III.B.1–2 (discussing the different types of power that coaches, athletic
trainers, athletic directors, and other athletic personnel have over the athlete, who relies on
this group of people for his or her well-being).
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concentrating on reactive procedures that hinge on inefficient reporting
mechanisms that apply only after the damage has already been done to
the student.193
1.

Few Strengths and Many Weaknesses of Current Policies

The Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance provides direction as to
investigation techniques, appropriate measures, and proper restitution
after sexual harassment is discovered.194 Preventative measures, which
are few, have generally been poorly implemented and have fallen short
of achieving any meaningful goal.195 Although the Supreme Court has
not yet ruled on what constitutes appropriate remedial or preventative
measures, some schools have adopted some type of program regarding
sexual harassment.196
One of the most comprehensive Title IX plans includes a definition
of sexual harassment, detailed procedures regarding dissemination of
the policy, designated reporting protocol, formal requirements for
investigating sexual harassment claims, and enforcement information.197
In reporting sexual harassment, the online brochure lists several people
available for receiving reports, including various supervisors, managers,

Preventative measures are needed because writing a check to an athlete after sexual
harassment has occurred cannot really redress the injury already done. See generally Liza
H. Gold, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION
(2004). “[E]xpert testimony that establishes the existence of a psychological injury and a
casual connection between the emotional distress and the defendant’s conduct can be
crucial in the assessment of liability in sexual harassment cases.” Id. at 172.
194
See supra Parts II.A, III.C (discussing OCR regulations).
195
See infra Part III.C.2 (comparing the lack of preventative measures in athletics with
those that are standard in the workplace where training seminars, informative articles,
brochures, and power point presentations are all a part of preventing harassment from ever
occurring). See, e.g., AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrim. § 858 (2007) (including prevention as an
important tool to fight harassment); Martha Neil, Tips for Preventing Sexual Harassment,
ABA JOURNAL: LAW NEWS NOW, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.abajournal.com/news/
tips_for_preventing_sexual_harassment/ (same).
196
See Guidance supra note 20, at IX (noting that schools are not required to create a
sexual harassment policy as long as its non-discrimination policy and procedures for
handling discrimination complaints are effective in eliminating all types of sex
discrimination, including sexual harassment). See also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 306 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Gebser, would reserve the issue of “whether a
district should be relieved from damages liability if it has in place, and effectively
publicizes and enforces, a policy to curtail and redress injuries caused by sexual
harassment.” Id. Justice Ginsburg commented that she would accept an effective policy for
reporting and redressing sexual harassment as an affirmative defense to a Title IX claim for
damages. Id. at 307 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
197
Infra note 211 (the policy referenced is that of University of California Berkeley). See
supra Parts II.A, III.C (discussing the Guidance).
193
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a Title IX Compliance Officer, and other designated employees.198 This is
a very strong policy that includes many key elements recommended by
the OCR, elements integral to preventing sexual harassment from ever
occurring.199
For example, widely disseminating a policy against harassment
establishes an overall community atmosphere that refuses to accept or
condone harassment as a natural part of the environment; this goes a
long way toward prevention.200 It is also important to clearly state which
individuals are available to receive reports of grievances.201 The most
obvious limitation to a plan like this is that it was clearly written with the
Gebser standard as a reference point, that is, focusing on avoiding legal
liability.202 A possible weakness with this type of plan is that with a
narrowing interpretation, courts could determine that school officials
absent from the list do not qualify as persons who can legally receive
“actual notice” in order to trigger school liability.203 A school could
remedy this dilemma by adding language that the persons able to
receive notice include, but are not limited to, those names on the list.
Finally, another flaw in most of these plans may not be in the written
policy itself but in the implementation of the policy.204 It is one thing to
write an appropriate policy, but the policy must also be followed,
established, and made known to coaches, athletic directors, other

198
See infra note 211 (discussing the University of California Berkeley’s Title IX policy
which directs students to the correct person for reporting harassment on campus).
199
Clearly, this is the institution’s ultimate goal. See SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT
ACADEMIC, supra note 154. The OCR comments that a school may “conduct periodic sexual
harassment awareness training for all school staff, including administrators, teachers, and
guidance counselors[.]” Id.
200
See Hogshead-Makar supra note 160, at 177. “Sexual harassment guidelines that
prohibit romantic relationships encourage prevention by firmly admonishing the entire
athletic community that the athletes are not an acceptable group of candidates from which
coaches are to draw their intimate partners.” Id.
201
See, e.g., Revised Guidance supra note 20. The Guidance states that “providing
students with several avenues to report sexual harassment is a very helpful means for
addressing and preventing sexually harassing conduct in the first place.” Guidance (1997)
supra note 103, at n.64.
202
See Finn supra note 109, at 11 (the director of the NCAA education department seemed
to be resigned to litigating sexual harassment, instead of preventing it: “‘The policy was in
the plan to look at down the road, but maybe we need to look at it sooner. For now, the
final recourse for athletes is litigation: the issue of harassment is so complex, so laden with
people's own biases and blind spots, that the law and liability may be the only way to catch
their attention.’”).
203
See supra Part II.C (explaining the clarified standard).
204
See generally supra Part III.B (emphasizing the difficulty with which any reporting
procedure could be implemented in an athletic office if the athletes are expected to report
incidents to one of the coach’s close acquaintances).
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officials, and, most importantly, athletes.205 This additional practice will
assist in preventing sexual harassment from being a problem.206 In
addition, the policy must be publicly disseminated.207 An additional
obvious weakness is the absence of educational training seminars as
hands-on training.208 The OCR discusses these types of seminars that,
while standard practice in the workplace, are absent in post-secondary
athletics.209
2.

The Department of Education’s
Recommended Regulations

Office

for

Civil

Rights’

The Department of Education requires schools that receive federal
funds to monitor third parties for discrimination and to refrain from
particular forms of interaction with outside entities that are known to
discriminate.210 Most schools also have their own policies on sexual
discrimination, while a smaller number have policies dealing directly
with sexual harassment. 211
205
See P. Solomon Bandy, Colorado Reinstates Barnett, Plans Changes to Athletic Department,
USA TODAY, May 27, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/big12/
2004-05-27-colorado-barnett-announcement_x.htm.
This was the case at Colorado
University which, after allegations of rape and sexual assault at recruiting parties,
implemented a “‘sweeping’ overhaul of the athletics department intended to boost
oversight, clamp down on its autonomy and place a new emphasis on academic
achievement.” Id. Some of the changes were initiated by the academic faculty, including
having the athletics department report to the top campus academics overseer, rather than a
separate chancellor. Id. See also Simpson, 500 F.3d 1170.
206
See Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 88. Incidental inconveniences caused to colleges and
universities by efforts to educate faculty and staff about sexual harassment and to
implement effective sexual harassment policies are justified in light of colleges’ legitimate
goal, under Title IX, of eradicating sexual harassment. Id.
207
See infra Part IV.B (suggesting an amended regulation to increase implementation of
preventive sexual harassment policies).
208
See, e.g., Finn supra note 109, at 11. “‘Maybe it takes something like [the Jennings case]
before people's consciousness gets raised and policies get enforced,’ [head soccer coach at
the University of Virginia] Heinrich said. ‘I think institutions have a responsibility to
educate their coaches.’” Id. Interestingly, Heinrich played for Dorrance at North Carolina.
Id.
209
See supra note 195 (discussing standard preventative measures taken in the
workplace).
210
See, e.g., 34 CFR §§ 106.31(b)(6), 106.31(d), 106.37(a)(2), 106.38(a), 106.51(a)(3) (1998)
(regulations specifying groups covered by Title IX and articulating sexually harassing
behavior prohibited as a manner of sexual discrimination).
211
See, e.g., University of Wyoming Guidelines to Prevent Sexual Harassment,
http://uwadmnweb.uwyo.edu/EmploymentPractices/guidelines_to_prevent_sexual_har.
htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2007); University of Colorado at Boulder Sexual Harassment
Policy and Procedures, https://www.cu.edu/policies/Personnel/sexharass.html (last
visited Oct. 12, 2007); Valparaiso University Employment Requirements,
http://www.valpo.edu/finaid/beforework.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) (All new
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The Office for Civil Rights has promulgated a Guidance and issued
several “Dear Colleague” letters with recommended standards for
investigating and enforcing sexual harassment claims in an educational
setting.212 However, these standards are not mandatory, and the
Guidance serves merely as guidance. 213 The Office has also published a
pamphlet that provides school administrators, teachers, students, and
parents with basic information to assist them in recognizing and
addressing sexual harassment under Title IX.214
The Guidance explains that an educational institution’s
responsibilities, as a condition of receiving federal financial assistance,
are to take “immediate and effective steps to end sexual harassment
when it occurs, prevent its recurrence, and remedy its effects.”215 Title IX
regulations require post-secondary recipients to designate a Title IX
Coordinator, adopt and disseminate a public nondiscrimination policy,
and enact grievance procedures to address complaints of discrimination

employees are required to take a training course entitled Sexual Harassment Prevention as
part of their employment at Valparaiso University); Boston University Sexual Harassment
Policy, http://www.bu.edu/handbook/policies/hr/harassment.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2007); University of Berkeley Campus Climate and Compliance: Title IV & Title IX (Aug.
2005) http://ccac.berkeley.edu/titleix.shtml [hereinafter Berkeley]. See also Waters v.
Metro. St. Univ., 91 F.Supp.2d 1287, 1293 (D. Minn. 2000), stating that:
In the absence of a statutory prohibition on such behavior [a professor
or coach dating a student], the Court would hope that colleges and
universities would take steps to police such activities internally, to set
higher standards than those required by law so as to insure an
academic environment which is devoted utterly to the goals of
learning and education rather than to the amorous pursuit[.]
Id.
212
See Revised Guidance, supra note 20; Dear Colleague Apr. 26, supra note 120; SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT ACADEMIC, supra note 154. This Guidance provides a strong
starting point for analysis. Title IX Legal Manual, supra note 46. In addition, the Guidance
provides institutions with a three prong test to determine whether they are in compliance
with Title IX in regards to athletic programs: first, the intercollegiate participation
opportunities for male and female students are “substantial[ly] proportion[ate]” to their
respective undergraduate enrollments; second, the school has a “history and continuing
practice of program expansion” for the underrepresented sex; and third, the school “fully
and effectively” accommodates the underrepresented sex.
Dear Colleague letter from
Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, to Colleague, FURTHER
CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY GUIDANCE REGARDING TITLE IX
COMPLIANCE (July 11, 2003) http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/title9guidance
Final.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
213
Id. See supra notes 20–23 (discussing specific requirements promulgated in the Code
of Federal Regulations).
214
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT ACADEMIC, supra note 154.
215
Dear Colleague letter from Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights
(Jan. 25, 2006) http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/sexhar-2006.html
(emphasis added).
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on the basis of sex in educational programs and activities.216 The OCR
has specifically stated that a policy against sex discrimination is one of
the most effective tools for preventing sexual harassment.217 Such a
policy informs students, parents, and employees that sexual harassment
will not be tolerated.218 Therefore, while the courts have not emphasized
the importance of prevention, the Department of Education has recently
identified prevention as one goal (however minor) of Title IX.219
However, it is extremely unfortunate that even the Revised
Guidance makes clear that there are ways for schools to avoid legal
liability when it states, “If the school takes these steps, it has avoided
violating Title IX.”220 The focus on reactive measures in the Guidance
continues, “[B]ecause a school will have the opportunity to take
reasonable corrective action before OCR issues a formal finding of
violation, a school does not risk losing its Federal funding solely because
discrimination occurred.”221
Another problem with the OCR’s
guidelines, recommendations, and other advice is that failure to comply
with these regulations does not establish the actual notice or deliberate
indifference needed for legal liability.222 The OCR has reviewed Title IX
compliance within the post-secondary school system and has discovered
that many recipients have not complied with all of the requirements of
216
34 C.F.R. § 106.9, 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a), 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b). See also Dear Colleague
letter Apr. 26, supra note 120; Dear Colleague letter from Kenneth L. Marcus, Office for
Civil Rights, Title IX GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, (Aug. 4, 2004),
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/responsibilities_ix_ps.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2008) (while aimed at pure discriminatory behavior, other Title IX regulations can
provide direction for sexual harassment grievance procedures).
217
Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at VIII. It is unfortunate that roughly 75% of the
Guidance focuses on reaction to harassment but has a mere three sentences in the
“Prevention” section. Id. It does, however, imply that more prevention is needed:
“Further, training for administrators, teachers, and staff and age-appropriate classroom
information for students can help to ensure that they understand what types of conduct
can cause sexual harassment and that they know how to respond.” Id.
218
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT ACADEMIC, supra note 154.
219
See supra Part II.A (discussing the original goal of Title IX). See generally Policy
Interpretation-Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 45 C.F.R. pt. 26 (1979).
The
Department of Education has interpreted Title IX provisions as they apply to traditional
educational institutions. Id.
220
Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at V.B.1.
221
Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at VI. The Guidance continues, “If the school has
taken, or agrees to take, each of these steps, OCR will consider the case against the school
resolved and will take no further action, other than monitoring compliance with an
agreement, if any, between the school and OCR.” Id. Clearly, the focus is on acting after
the fact. See id.
222
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292. One option is for the Department of Education to enforce the
regulation administratively: “Agencies generally have authority to promulgate and
enforce requirements that effectuate the statute's nondiscrimination mandate[.]” Id. (citing
20 U.S.C. § 1682).
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the Title IX implementing regulations.223
Examples of missing
requirements included a general failure to designate and train at least
one school official to be the Title IX Coordinator, a failure to have and
publicly disseminate notice of the nondiscrimination policy, and a failure
to adopt and publish Title IX grievance procedures to address sex
discrimination claims.224 These deficiencies directly correlate to the
weakened Gebser standard because, clearly, schools are focusing on
reacting instead of preventing.225
It is much easier for schools to concentrate on reacting properly to
sexual harassment allegations rather than preventing them, as the
Supreme Court has said that the school shall not be deliberately
indifferent once it has notice of harassment.226 However, these reactive
measures are insufficient because the athlete has already been injured.227
The purely reactionary system relies on the athlete reporting the
harassment to a person with whom she may not be comfortable because
of the power imbalance.228 It is not being claimed that reactive measures
are an evil; to the contrary, remedial measures are needed if
discrimination is discovered.229 However, post-secondary schools need

223
Dear Colleague letter Aug 4, 2004, supra note 216. See Revised Guidance, supra note
20, at VI. Normally, the OCR does not become involved until a complaint is filed:
If OCR is asked to investigate or otherwise resolve incidents of sexual
harassment of students, including incidents caused by employees,
other students, or third parties, OCR will consider whether—(1) the
school has a disseminated policy prohibiting sex discrimination under
Title IX
and effective grievance procedures;
(2) the school
appropriately investigated or otherwise responded to allegations of
sexual harassment; and (3) the school has taken immediate and
effective corrective action responsive to the harassment, including
effective actions to end the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and, as
appropriate, remedy its effects.
Id.
224
Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at VI. Even under OCR’s optimistic administrative
enforcement scheme, “recipients always receive actual notice and the opportunity to take
appropriate corrective action before any finding of violation or possible loss of federal
funds.” Id., at V.B.1.
225
See supra Part III.C (discussing school policies; schools with reactive policies and
concrete grievance procedures are considered to be at the forefront of the battle against
sexual harassment).
226
See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 274 (noting that this is disappointing, considering that the
majority in Gebser found that Title IX focuses on protecting individuals from recipients of
federal funds rather than on compensating victims of discrimination).
227
A damages check cannot fully repair the athlete if he or she has been sexually
harassed.
228
See supra Part III.B (examining the power imbalances inherent in college athletics and
detailing the way in which this power imbalance can impede reporting mechanisms).
229
See 28 C.F.R. §54.110 (2000). The common rule provides:
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to pay more attention to complying with the preventative measures
described by the OCR.230
Schools should take interest beyond
preventing legal liability and should seek to give their athletes the
educational opportunity Title IX was intended to protect by preventing
sexual harassment on athletes.231
In particular, as discussed earlier, the athlete is especially vulnerable
because of her position at the bottom of the power hierarchy.232 Reactive
measures will not make the athlete whole again.233 This is why it is
important for athletic offices to establish a strongly worded sexual
harassment policy that will “communicate a set of institutional values
and a code of behavior that [will] go a long way towards preventing an
environment of sexual harassment.”234 A change in the Title IX standard
would increase a school’s interest in stopping sexual harassment, and
additional OCR regulations would promote prevention and facilitate
reporting of sexual harassment in the athletic environment.235
IV. CONTRIBUTION
The enforcement of Title IX in athletics is impeded by a two-part
problem of an exploited interpretation of the Gebser standard and the
inherent power structure that exists in athletics.236 When these two
problems combine, the result is that institutions form the bare minimum
in reactive measures and do not prevent sexual harassment.237 Until
athletic offices promulgate a proactive sexual harassment policy and are
(a) Remedial action[:] If the designated agency official finds that a
recipient has discriminated against persons on the basis of sex in an
education program or activity, such recipient shall take such remedial
action as the designated agency official deems necessary to overcome
the effects of such discrimination.
Id.
See supra notes 20–23 (describing OCR regulations).
See generally Finn, supra note 109, at 11 (drawing attention to the new risks presented
because of the increased number of women participating in sports). “‘There’s more
opportunity for female athletes than ever before, but the flip side is that there’s more risk to
those athletes because we haven’t developed policies, legislation and screening processes to
keep up with the social progress made by Title IX.’” Id.
232
See supra Part III.B (discussing the power hierarchy).
233
See infra Part IV (suggesting changes in the OCR regulations to focus on preventing
the harassment).
234
Hogshead-Makar, supra note 160, at 173–74.
235
See infra Part IV.A (suggesting the Court adopt a new standard for school liability);
Part IV.B (proposing amendments to OCR regulations).
236
See supra Part III.A (discussing the Gebser interpretation) and Part III.B (exploring the
power imbalance).
237
See supra Part III.C (explaining how the power imbalance and the Gebser language
result in weakened policies).
230
231
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held to it by the OCR, sexual harassment on the playing field and in the
locker room will continue to be a danger for athletes.238
Sexual harassment should not be the price an athlete is required to
pay to play his or her sport of choice at a highly competitive level.239
Even the OCR’s Revised Guidance does not provide enough focus on
proactive measures to prevent sexual harassment.240 In addition, while
compliance with these measures is a “requirement” for federally funded
schools, the reality is that this is not enforced until there is a problem, so
that the Department of Education is merely putting out fires instead of
educating about and preventing harassment.241 A college should be
required to enact strict policies against sexual harassment and playercoach sexual relationships, publicly disseminate these policies,
thoroughly screen coaches before hiring them, and provide athletes with
easily accessible personnel outside of the power sphere of the coaches to
which they may report harassment.242
A. Proposed Department of Education Regulations to Prevent Sexual
Harassment
The Department of Education’s regulatory requirements are
insufficient to prevent sexual harassment. The OCR agency enforcement
scheme must lead the way in amending school liability for sexual
harassment in college athletics.243 While the OCR regulations must not
go beyond Title IX language, they may further the congressional intent
behind Title IX.244 In addition, by adopting these regulations, schools
and athletic officials will demonstrate the school’s set of values, which
will prevent an environment of sexual harassment from developing.245

See supra Part II.A (exploring the OCR’s administrative regulations intended to clarify
Title IX).
239
See supra Parts II.D, III.B (discussing the Jennings case, in which the women endured
sexual harassment, believing it was the only way to further their soccer careers). See also
Henderson, 469 F.3d at 479 (in which a coach threatened that if the players complained
about him, their playing time would be cut).
240
See supra note 111 (emphasizing the passive voice of Title IX, indicating the focus on
the benefited class).
241
See supra Part III.C (analyzing the details of the OCR’s responsibility under the
Guidance).
242
See generally Revised Guidance, supra note 20.
243
See Jennings, 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 247 (2007) (the Supreme
Court refused to decide the issue of actual notice in athletics).
244
See supra Part II.A (explaining the legislative intent of Title IX and the role of the OCR
in enforcing the statute).
245
See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the current recommendations made by the OCR and
the weaknesses inherent in any policy that focuses on reaction rather than prevention).
238
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Proposed amendment to 34 C.F.R. 106.9:246
(a) Notification of policy. (1) Each recipient shall
implement specific and continuing steps to notify
applicants for admission and employment, students and
parents of elementary and secondary school students,
employees, extracurricular activity directors or coaches,
sources of referral of applicants for admission and
employment, and all unions or professional
organizations holding collective bargaining or
professional agreements with the recipient, that it does
not discriminate on the basis of sex in the educational
program or activity which it operates, it does not permit
sexual harassment of its students by employees or by other
students, and that it is required by Title IX and this part
not to discriminate or permit harassment in such a
manner. Such notification shall contain such
information, and be made in such manner, as the
Assistant Secretary finds necessary to apprise such
persons of the protections against discrimination or
harassment assured them by Title IX and this part, but
shall state at least that the requirement not to
discriminate or harass in the education program or
activity extends to employment therein, and to
admission thereto unless Subpart C does not apply to
the recipient, and that inquiries concerning the
application of Title IX and this part to such recipient
may be referred to the employee designated pursuant to
§ 106.8, or to the Assistant Secretary. . . . (3) In addition
to the aforementioned notification required in paragraphs
(a)(2) and (b) of this section, following the distribution of the
sexual harassment publication to every student and employee
of such recipient, the Title IX coordinator for each recipient
shall hold a seminar in which students, athletes, teachers or
professors, coaches, and other employees are notified of specific
individuals on staff who are qualified to receive reports of
discrimination or harassment and provide guidance to
students who are victims of sexual harassment or
discrimination. At this seminar, the Title IX coordinator shall
also conduct sexual harassment awareness training for all
246
The language in regular font is taken from 34 C.F.R. 106.9. The proposed additions,
italicized, are the contributions of the author.
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staff. In addition, informal meetings shall be held at the start
of every athletic season for the team, coaches, and other
involved personnel regarding the unacceptability of playercoach sexual relationships and the reporting procedure
available in the event inappropriate sexual behavior is
experienced or witnessed. There shall be at least two (2)
persons available who are outside the athletic office to receive
such reports; these persons shall be made well-known to the
athletes. These persons shall also have their names and
availabilities published and distributed to students, athletes,
teachers, and other staff members. All of this information
shall be available in writing as well as imparted to the
student-athletes during the seasonal meeting.
Commentary
The OCR is charged with enforcing Title IX against recipients of
federal funds.247 The proposed additions and modifications to the OCR
regulations address both the insufficient reporting mechanisms and the
power imbalance inherent in athletics.248 First, by explicitly mentioning
sexual harassment as a prohibited behavior, it encourages the
establishment of institutional values and public awareness of the issue
that will prevent the establishment of an environment vulnerable to
sexual harassment.249 The proposed amendments also point to coaches
and extracurricular directors as responsible parties for preventing sexual
harassment.250 The wide-spread dissemination regarding the relevant
parties to whom the student-athletes may report harassing behavior will
accomplish the two-fold purpose of encouraging an environment
focused on prevention and increasing the accessibility of officials for
reporting purposes.251 Finally, by mandating training and information
seminars, the Title IX coordinator will ensure that the school community
understands what harassment is, that it will not be accepted, and how to
prevent it.252 This increased effort on the part of the OCR, and in turn by
individual schools, will work in conjunction with the second proposal of
See supra Part II.A (articulating the administrative regulations the OCR has passed in
its attempts to enforce Title IX).
248
See supra Part III.B (exploring the power imbalance); Part III.C (reviewing existing and
OCR-recommended policies).
249
See supra Part III.C (discussing the Revised Guidance).
250
See supra Part II.C (explaining the creation of the actual notice standard); Part II.D
(establishing the appropriate person to receive notice prong of the current standard).
251
See supra Part III.B (exploring the power imbalances which can impede reporting
mechanisms).
252
See supra note 217 (the OCR suggests that a school may conduct training sessions).
247
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this Note: modifying the legal standard for establishing school liability
in private litigation.
B. Restoring Faith in Title IX: Proposed Test for Determining School Liability
This Note proposes the following modified test for school liability:253
Only when a federal funding recipient knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, and was
deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment is that
recipient liable for monetary damages. In addition, the
harassment must be so severe, pervasive, and or
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the
victims of access to, or significantly reduce the victim’s
access to, the educational opportunities or benefits
provided by the school.
Commentary
The current Gebser standard for private litigation, as discussed above
in Part II.B, utilizes an “actual notice” test that, when used in the
athletics environment, precludes many reports of sexual harassment
from triggering school liability for monetary damages.254 The proposed
amended test, which should be adopted by the Supreme Court,
incorporates the notice language used by the OCR in its Revised
Standard.255 The standard for private litigation should be brought into
line with the OCR agency enforcement scheme. This adoption would
impose on courts an obligation under Title IX to protect student-athletes
from sexual harassment.256 Courts could then begin to interpret the law
to ensure that federal funds recipients take reasonable steps to protect
against and prevent sexual harassment. OCR interprets its regulations to
ensure that recipients take reasonable action to address, rather than
neglect, reasonably obvious discrimination.257
Next, the proposed standard states that significantly depriving a
student-athlete of access to an educational opportunity is sufficient to
trigger school liability. A court’s final decision should not rest on
253
The language in regular font is taken from Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 and Davis, 526 U.S.
at 650. The proposals are the contributions of the author. Specifically, proposed additions
are italicized and proposed deletions are struck through.
254
See Parts III.B–C (analyzing the power imbalances in college athletics and the way in
which this power structure inhibits direct reporting).
255
See Revised Guidance, supra note 20.
256
See supra Part II.A (discussing the original intent behind the passage of Title IX).
257
See supra Parts III.B–C (examining the OCR regulations).
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whether an athlete’s educational benefits have been completely denied
or simply reduced.258 This is in line with the original goal of Title IX—to
provide equal access and equal educational opportunities, regardless of
gender.259
In addition to these changes, the pool of persons that is to receive
notice should be enlarged to include regular teachers, coaches, and other
reasonable staff members.
Again, the guidelines given by the
Department of Education provide a helpful starting point. Under the
Revised Guidance, the idea of who is a “responsible employee” is
broader than the legal requirement of who is to receive notice.260 That is,
even if a responsible employee is not empowered with the authority to
address the discrimination and take corrective action, she still has an
obligation to report it to the school officials with that power.261 Who a
responsible employee is or whether it would be reasonable for a studentathlete to believe that employee is responsible will vary depending on
the type of position held by the employee, the relationship between the
athlete and the employee, and school practices and procedures.262 This
proposed change in the notice standard and in the severity of treatment
needed to trigger school liability would remedy the weak Gebser
standard so that it will be able to fulfill the original intent of Title IX as
articulated by Senator Bayh.263
V. CONCLUSION
Title IX has the potential to be a powerful tool to fight sexual
harassment in college athletics. However, courts have fashioned a
standard in determining liability that simply does not accomplish what
the legislature intended Title IX to do. The power imbalances that exist
in a college athletic department make the environment vulnerable to
harassment and foster an environment in which it is difficult to find the
proper person to whom harassment may be reported. Because of these
two problems, schools have focused on adopting reactive measures that
comply with the Department of Education’s bare minimum regulations.
See supra Part II.C.3 (using specific cases to demonstrate the level of harassment that
currently fulfills the Gebser standard).
259
See supra Part II (tracking the betrayal of the original goal of Title IX).
260
See Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at IV.C.
261
See supra Part III (analyzing the problems the current version of the Gebser standard
has created with the “actual notice” standard, in that it eliminates most of the school staff—
to whom an athlete is likely to report sexual harassment—from being able to receive
notice).
262
See Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at n.74.
263
See supra Part II.A (discussing legislative intent of Title IX); Part II.C (articulating the
current Gebser standard); Part II.D (clarifying the standard in Davis).
258
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Colleges and universities need to take a more active role in preventing
sexual harassment, in protecting their athletes, and in informing the
entire community of a general intolerance for any form of sexual
harassment. In addition, the standard should be relaxed, and the
Department of Education should promulgate additional regulations for
the prevention of sexual harassment. Title IX is not dead, it just needs a
little breath of fresh air.
Let us return to the star softball pitcher introduced in Part I of this
Note, who has been left alone to deal with her injuries. With the
proposed improvements and additions to Title IX, our pitcher would be
secure in knowing to whom she should report her coach’s harassing
behavior. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, this improved
sexual harassment prevention plan would stop the coach from ever
harassing her because the team would exist in a community where it is
clear that sexual harassment will not be tolerated. Finally, if all
preventative measures fail, our pitcher could receive an injunctive order
from the court, and the school would be liable to our pitcher for
monetary damages because it had notice of the harassment and failed to
act. Courts have watered down Title IX, and when that weakened
standard combines with the power imbalances inherent in the college
athletic world, schools are able to dodge legal liability by promulgating
minimal reactive regulations. Additional regulations are needed, and
school prevention plans should be required so that Title IX may once
again protect student athletes.
Brianna J. Schroeder∗

∗

J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University School of Law (2009); M.S. International
Commerce and Policy, Valparaiso University (2007); B.A. Sociology, Carthage College
(2005); B.A. Criminal Justice, Carthage College (2005). To my family, first and foremost:
Jeff, Ruth, Justin, Zachary, and Jordan: Thanks for always being so great. Special thanks to
the Lady Reds—my teammates and my best friends. Finally, thank you to Rosalie Berger
Levinson, Ivan Bodensteiner, JoEllen Lind, and Susan Stuart for all the guidance they have
given me over the years.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/12

